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A POTENTIAL PROBLEM OF LITIGATING
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AT THE
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea (known hereafter as the "Extraordinary
Chambers" or the "EC"),1 is a unique experiment. It is a mixed
tribunal containing elements of both Cambodian and international law.2 The tribunal will prosecute "senior leaders" and
"those who were most responsible" for the atrocities that occurred between 1975 and 1979, when Cambodia was ruled by the
Communist Party of Kampuchea. 3 While mixed national/international tribunals have been created before, most notably in Sierra Leone, none has tried to render justice for crimes that were
committed so far in the past.
The gap of three decades between the crimes and the court
proceedings has created a number of significant obstacles for the
Extraordinary Chambers. Some are obvious, like the difficulty in
finding physical evidence and witnesses. Some obstacles are less
1. It is also sometimes informally called the "Khmer Rouge Tribunal," but this
name is disfavored.
2. For instance, the substantive law will be a combination of Cambodian criminal law (including homicide, torture and religious persecution) and crimes under
international law (including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity). See
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, arts. 3-6 [hereinafter Extraordinary Chambers Law]. Procedural rules
at the EC are also a mix of national and international rules. The Extraordinary
Chambers uses Cambodian procedural law, but "shall" exercise its jurisdiction "in
accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law"
as described in Articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id. art. 33. To meet this mandate the ECCC judges have passed a special
set of "Internal Rules" that will apply to cases before the ECCC. The Internal Rules
are based on Cambodian criminal procedure but incorporate minimum international
standards of justice, fairness and due process.
3. See Extraordinary Chambers Law, art. 2.
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obvious, like the potential problem of the rapid development of
international criminal law, particularly in the law of crimes
against humanity, since the end of the Cold War. The crimes
within the jurisdiction of the EC occurred prior to this recent
period of development, and there is a possibility that the EC's
definition of crimes against humanity cannot be applied without
violating the principle of legality.
Crimes against humanity has been a crime under international law since 1946, but unlike genocide or "grave breaches" of
the Geneva Conventions it was not the subject of an international convention that codified the elements of a crime against
humanity. As a result of the lack of a widely accepted definition,
different courts defined the crime differently. The definition that
will be used in the Extraordinary Chambers is very similar to that
used in Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). 4 However, this articulation differs
from that used by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, as well as
that of the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter, Control
Council Order No. 10 and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. In 1975, crimes against humanity did exist as an
explicit crime, but the elements of that crime were defined by
customary international law, not by a treaty.
This creates a potential problem in determining what the elements of a crime against humanity were at the time the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the EC were committed. The principle
of legality, which prohibits the retroactive application of criminal
law, is a fundamental principle of law. The purpose of the principle of legality is to ensure that no one is held criminally liable for
an act that the accused could not predict would be a crime at the
time the act was committed. Foreseeability is an important component of the principle of legality, and an accused can be guilty
of a crime even if the law was unsettled at the time the act was
committed, as long as criminal liability was foreseeable. If the
definition of crimes against humanity that is contained in the
Statute of the Extraordinary Chambers was unforeseeable in
1975, then the EC may be limited to the 1975 definition. Several
writers have noted the existence of this potential problem with
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and offered opinions
4. Compare Extraordinary Chambers Law, art. 5 with Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR]. The Extraordinary Chamber's definition of
crimes against humanity is much closer to the one in the ICTR than it is to the
definitions that appear in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY)
or the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC, ICTY, and ICTR are discussed in more detail supra in Sections II(I)(3)-II(I)(5).
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on whether it will affect the court. 5 However, as far as the author
is aware, none has undertaken a full analysis of it.

The question of whether crimes against humanity can only
take place in connection with an armed conflict is the most likely
area in which there could be a substantive difference between the
1975 definition and the modern definition. Consequently, this
article will focus on the nexus with armed conflict. It will begin

with a history of the development of crimes against humanity,
focusing on the requirement of a connection with armed conflict,
and then proceed to an analysis of whether crimes against humanity required a nexus with armed conflict in 1975. Once the
state of customary international law in 1975 has been examined,
this article will apply the principle of legality to try to draw some
conclusions about whether or not the Extraordinary Chambers
can use the definition in its Statute without violating that

principle.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Like most legal concepts, "crimes against humanity" evolved
over time. It grew out of the body of rules regulating the use of
force during war that was developed during the late nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries, and it shares much of its early history with the history of the development of the laws that govern
armed conflicts. 6 Even after it became a specified crime in the
5. See Helen Horsington, The Cambodian Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Promise of a Hybrid Tribunal, 5 MELB. J. OF INT'L L. 462, 473-74 (2004) (describing a
potential problem with EC's definition of crimes against humanity); William A.
Schabas, Should the Khmer Rouge Leaders be Prosecutedfor Genocide or Crimes
Against Humanity?, SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH MAGAZINE, Oct. 2001, at 37 (noting that defendants at the EC will argue that the definition of crimes against humanity violates the principle of legality); Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, The Khmer Rouge Did
Commit Genocide, SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH MAGAZINE, Nov. 2001, at 32. (responding to William Schabas and arguing that crimes against humanity did not require a nexus with armed conflict in 1975); Raymund Johansen, International
Criminal Law was not Intended to Supplant Domestic Criminal Law, SEARCHING
FOR THE TRUTH MAGAZINE, Dec. 2001, at 40 (arguing that the nexus with armed
conflict was an artificial jurisdictional element inserted into the Nuremberg Charter
and that it never represented a substantive element of crimes against humanity);
Suzannah Linton, Random Thoughts on Schabas-Stanton-Johansen,SEARCHING FOR
THE TRUTH MAGAZINE, Jan. 2002, at 31 (agreeing with Johansen that a nexus with
armed conflict was not part of the customary definition of crimes against humanity
in 1975). Searching for the Truth Magazine is a publication of the Documentation
Center of Cambodia, http://www.dccam.org/, a Cambodian NGO that works to document the crimes and atrocities of the Khmer Rouge era. The legal articles that
appear in Searching for the Truth Magazine are short and non-technical.
6. See Stuart Ford, Legal Processes of Change: Article 2(4) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 75, 76-79 (1999) (discussing
the evolution of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations); Leslie
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wake of WWII, it retained its connection to the laws governing
armed conflicts 7 for many years.

From the 1960s and into the 1980s, it was not clear whether
the nexus with armed conflict remained a substantive element of
the crime. The International Law Commission, after much internal debate, had suggested progressively developing crimes
against humanity by removing the nexus with armed conflict in
1954, but the Commission's suggestion was not acted upon by the
United Nations. Many developing states tacitly supported the removal of the nexus requirement during the negotiation of the
1968 Convention on Statutes of Limitation, but an almost equal
number of developed states opposed them. Certain crimes that
fall under the heading of crimes against humanity, like genocide
and apartheid, were codified in international conventions. However, crimes against humanity was not codified in an authoritative manner, and evidence of state practice remained scarce.
Therefore, there was lingering uncertainty over whether the
nexus with armed conflict was still required.
That uncertainty was resolved in the 1990s. The debate reemerged at the International Law Commission, and in the creation of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. By 1998, the result, was a general acceptance that
crimes against humanity was no longer a subset of the laws and
customs of war, but represented an independent crime that can
occur irrespective of whether or not there is an armed conflict.
Unfortunately, it is not clear exactly when the requirement of a
C. Green, InternationalRegulations of Armed Conflicts, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
NAL LAw, CRIMES

CRIMI-

355, 362-66 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) (describing the

development of laws governing the conduct of armed conflicts during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
7. Terminology will be important throughout this article. The phrases "armed
conflict" and "war" are both used in this paper, but they are not interchangeable.
Prior to the Charter of the United Nations, there was a distinction drawn in international law between war and lesser uses of force. Most of the rules that had been
devised to regulate uses of force applied only to wars, not to lesser uses of force. See
Ford, supra note 6, at 76-78. After the Charter was written, the term "war" was
dropped from international law in favor of "armed conflict." Armed conflict includes all uses of force and thus encompasses both the earlier concept of "war" and
also the lesser uses of force that existed but were not regulated prior to 1946. Id. at
78-79; Green, supra note 6, at 371 (noting that the 1949 Geneva Conventions replaced "war" with "armed conflict"). The Charter also did away with the need for a
declaration of war. Today, all uses of armed conflict are regulated, irrespective of
whether they are termed wars or whether a formal declaration of war is made. See
Ford, supra note 6, at 80-81.
This paper will use "war" in its historical sense when describing events that
occurred before and during WWII. The term "armed conflict" will be used for
events after WWII. Unfortunately, the terminology may get a little confused in the
period immediately after WWII because some commentators and documents continued to refer to wars rather than armed conflicts for several years after the United
Nations Charter came into force.
HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 130 2006-2007
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nexus disappeared from the customary definition of crimes
against humanity.
A.

BEFORE WORLD WAR I-THE

ORIGINS OF THE TERM

"LAws OF HUMANITY"

There have been restrictions on how and when wars can be
fought for as long as war has existed. 8 However, most of the
modern law governing armed conflicts descends from rules first
established in late nineteenth century Europe. Those rules were
based, to some extent, on the norms and customs established in
earlier periods, 9 but were also driven by the changing nature of
warfare' 0 and the emergence of the modern nation-state."
The precursor to the phrase "crimes against humanity" first
appeared in the Preamble of the Declaration of St. Petersburg in
1868. The Declaration of St. Petersburg was created in response
to the invention of bullets that exploded on contact with their
target and prohibited them in certain circumstances.' 2 While the
Declaration's prohibition was limited in scope-it only prohibited exploding bullets that weighed less than 400 grams and only
applied if all the belligerents were parties to the Declarationthe Preamble has had lasting significance:
[T]he progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war; the only legitimate objective which states should endeavor to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; for
this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible
number of men; this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; the employment of
8. See Green, supra note 6, at 355-61 (discussing the historical development of
rules that govern the use of force); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity,
in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMES, supra note 6, at 521, 524-29 (noting at
524 "For over seven thousand years, humanitarian principles regulating armed conflicts evolved gradually in different civilizations."); Remigiusz Bierzanek, War
Crimes: History and Definition, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, ENFORCEMENT 87, 87-89 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
9. See Green, supra note 6, at 358-61 (discussing the slow accumulation of rules
in Europe during the Middle Ages); Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 529-31 (discussing
the rules and norms that were developed during the Middle Ages).
10. See Green, supra note 6, at 364 (discussing the Declaration of St. Petersburg
and the calling of the first Hague Conference in 1874, which was precipitated by the
development of explosive bullets and the desire to regulate the use of this new form
of ammunition).
11. Id. at 362-65; id. at 362 ("Members of fighting units were now mustered in
national armies and war was no longer a matter of personal relations between
princely commanders .
.
12. Id. at 364.
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would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of
such arms
13
humanity.

The Preamble is important to humanitarian law because it embodies the principles of humanity and distinction. However, it is
also important to the evolution of crimes against humanity because it suggested that the failure to follow the rules of war
would be "contrary to the laws of humanity."
The language about "laws of humanity" seemed to resonate,
because it was used again in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907, which form the basis for much of the modern law regulating warfare. 1 4 In its Preamble, the 1907 Convention dealing with
the laws and customs of war noted that its goal was to "diminish
the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit," and to
serve "the interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs
of civilization" by "revis[ing] the general laws and customs of
war" and providing a "general rule of conduct for the belligerents." 15 However, the parties to the Convention also recognized
that it could not provide rules for every conceivable use of force,
so they included what has come to be known as the Martens
Clause (after the Russian diplomat who drafted it16):
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare
that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by
them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rules of the principles of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages established among civithe laws of humanity, and the dictates of
lized peoples, from
17

public conscience.
Language similar to the Martens Clause has subsequently been
included in other agreements concerning humanitarian law, 18 in13. Id. at 364 (quoting the Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29 - Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted
in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 101 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Tomans eds., 3d
rev. ed. 1988) (emphasis added)).
14. See Green, supra note 6, at 365.
15. See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, Preamble, reprinted in 2 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 25 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia SwaakGoldman eds., 2000) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS AND CASES]. Similar language was
included in the 1899 Convention. See Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Jul. 29, 1899, Preamble, available from the website of the
International Committee of the Red Cross at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/
150?OpenDocument (last visited on Mar. 28, 2006) [hereinafter ICRC].
16. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 536 n.97.
17. See Convention (IV), supra note 15, at 25 (emphasis added). The 1899 Convention also includes a version of the Martens Clause. See Convention (II), supra
note 15, Preamble.
18. See Green, supra note 6, at 365.
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cluding each of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949,19 and Protocols
20
I and II to the Geneva Conventions.
The phrase "laws of humanity," as it was used in the Martens Clause, is clearly not a reference to a particular law or crime.
Nor is it a phrase that appears to have had a specific legal mean-

ing prior to its inclusion in the Declaration of St. Petersburg. In
part, it may be a reference to the many national laws and military
regulations that governed aspects of armed conflicts. In the late
nineteenth century, many countries had codes that governed the
conduct of their armed forces, which were based on or influenced
by the so-called "Lieber Code" adopted by the United States
during the American Civil War. 21 These could be viewed as the
laws of humanity that governed armed conflicts. However, the
language also has clear moral and humanitarian overtones and
probably was not intended solely as a reference to nations' domestic laws.
It may also be a reference to the "natural law" doctrine, 22
the principle of humanity, or common sense. Natural law sug-

gests that there are certain limitations on our actions that exist
because of our very nature. These "laws" do not change from
place to place and from time to time and are separate and independent of positive law (the laws that states enact). 23 The principle of humanity is a pillar of modern humanitarian law and posits
that it is unlawful and immoral to cause unnecessary sufferingsuffering that is unrelated or disproportionate to military objec19. See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 63; Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 62; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 142; Convention (IV) relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 158. All four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contain the same language about the effect of denouncing
the Conventions: "The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict
shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they
result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience." The Geneva Conventions are available at the ICRC website at http://www.icrc.org/ihl (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
20. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977,
art. 1(2) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, Jun. 8, 1977, Preamble [hereinafter Protocol II]. Protocols I and II
can be found on the ICRC website at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO?OpenView
(last visited Mar. 29, 2006).
21. See Green, supra note 6, at 363; Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 534.
22. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 527.
23. See Natural Law (ethics), Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2005,
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia-761553008/NaturalLaw-(ethics).html
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2006).
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tives. 24 Lastly, it may also be a reference to common sense-the
not be
idea that some things are obviously wrong and should
25
done even if there is no specific rule prohibiting them.
M. Cherif Bassiouni suggests that the "laws of humanity"

are an early version of a "general principle[ ] of law recognized

by civilized nations. '2 6 Indeed, most countries seemed to agree
that there existed "laws of humanity" that were somehow distinct

from the "laws of nations" (treaties) and the "usages established
among civilized peoples" (customary international law) that governed how hostilities could be conducted. They also seemed to
agree that these laws of humanity were unwritten and could fill in

gaps in the existing laws and customs of war. In this way it does
look like a "general principle of law" as defined in the Statute of
27
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

However, it has the same problems that have limited the
usefulness of "general principles of law"-nobody could define
"laws of humanity." Everyone assumed that an observer would
be able to identify a violation of the "laws of humanity," even
though there were no written rules and even though the people
using the phrase may have had very different ideas about what it
meant. This is a problematic basis for a crime under international law. Indeed, it seems possible that the phrase "laws of humanity" persisted in part because it had no fixed definition.
Countries could agree that there were "laws of humanity," but
they did not have to go through the difficult, time-consuming and
24. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 530-31 (discussing the evolution of the principle of humanity). The Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868) incorporates the principle of humanity when it states that "it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible
number of men; this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable."
See supra note 13.
25. See, e.g., DOCUMENTS AND CASES, supra note 15, at 43-44 n.65 (describing
the statement of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein at the Hague Conference of 1907
where he suggested that "[c]onscience, good sense and the sense of duty imposed by
the principles of humanity" should guide military operations).
26. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 535 ("This historical evolution demonstrates
that what became known as 'Crimes Against Humanity' existed as part of 'general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations' long before the Charter's formulation in 1945."). "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" was
adopted as a catch-all source of international law by the International Court of Justice in 1946. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1). See generally Ford, supra note 6, at 84 (describing the role of Article 38 of the Statute of the
ICJ in defining the sources of international law).
27. See Ford, supra note 6, at 84 n.70 (noting that "general principles of law"
were probably included in the Statute of the ICJ to prevent gaps in international law
in situations where there was no treaty or customary law). Cf. STEVEN R. RATNER
& JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that international tribunals tend to examine

'general principles of law' only if there is no applicable convention of customary
norm).
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probably futile process of trying to define them. In this way, the
phrase may be somewhere between a hortatory statement and a
rhetorical flourish. However, to the extent that countries recognized the existence of "laws of humanity," those laws were always part of the regime that regulated the conduct of war.

B.

WORLD WAR I-THE FIRST SUGGESTION OF CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT FOR VIOLATING THE "LAWS OF HUMANITY"

World War I saw the international community take the first
steps toward the creation of a specific crime called "crimes
against humanity." There were two principal developments during World War I. The first was the 1915 joint declaration of
France, Great Britain, and Russia denouncing the massacre of
ethnic Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. The second was the
report of the special commission convened by the victors to examine the question of who was responsible for the war and what
penalty they should pay. Together, these two documents advanced the concept of the "laws of humanity" considerably.
On May 24, 1915, during World War I, France, Great Britain
and Russia sent a joint declaration to the Ottoman Empire condemning the widespread massacre of Armenians, and vowing to
hold responsible those members of the Ottoman government implicated in the massacres. 28 The joint declaration is noteworthy
because it describes the massacres as "crimes of Turkey against
humanity and civilization. '29 The declaration itself is very short 30
and does not appear to use the words in a legal sense, even
though there is the threat of some sort of punishment. However,
there were no prosecutions for the members of the Ottoman government responsible for the Armenian massacres, 3 1 and the Al28. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 536-37.
29. See Joint Declaration, Fr.-Gr. Brit.-Russ., May 24, 1915, available at http://
www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.160/current-category.7/affirmation-detail.
html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
30. Id. The complete text of the declaration is: "For about a month the Kurd
and Turkish populations of Armenia has been massacring Armenians with the connivance and often assistance of Ottoman authorities. Such massacres took place in
middle April at Erzerum, Dertchun, Eguine, Akn, Bitlis, Mush, Sassun, Zeitun, and
throughout Cilicia. Inhabitants of about one hundred villages near Van were all murdered. In that city Armenian quarter is besieged by Kurds. At the same time in
Constantinople Ottoman Government ill-treats inoffensive Armenian population. In
view of those new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the Allied
governments announce publicly to the Sublime-Porte that they will hold personally
responsible [for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman government and those of
their agents who are implicated in such massacres."
31. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 540-41. Provisions that would have allowed
the Allies to try those responsible for the massacres were included in the language of
the Treaty of Sevres. Peace Treaty of Sevres, Aug. 10, 1920, art. 230 (never adopted,
superseded by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne), available at
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lies eventually provided an amnesty. 32 Consequently, the legal

legacy of the joint declaration is quite limited. Nevertheless, it is
generally agreed that this is the birth of the phrase "crimes
against humanity."
The second major step was the creation of the "Commission
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforce-

ment of Penalties" (hereafter "Commission"). It was created by
the victorious powers in 1919, to report upon the "responsibility
of the authors of the war," the "facts as to the breaches of the

laws and customs of war," the "responsibility for these offences
attaching to particular members of the enemy forces," and the
"constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the
trial of these offences. '' 33 The report is important for several reasons. Most importantly, while the Commission was asked to report on breaches of "the laws and customs of war," it enlarged its
own mandate and referred consistently to breaches of "the laws
and customs of war and of the laws of humanity. '34 This is cer-

tainly not an accident, as the United States' representatives refused to endorse the report, in part, because they "object[ed] to
declaring the laws and principles of humanity as a standard
whereby the acts of their enemies should be measured and pun'35
ished by a tribunal.
http://www.lib.byu.edu/-rdh/wwi/versa/sevindex.html. Article 230 of the Treaty of
Sevres called on the Turkish government "to hand over to the Allied Powers the
persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the
massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war ....
" Article 230
also gave the Allies the right to designate which tribunal would hear cases related to
the massacres. However, the Treaty of Sevres never went into effect and was replaced with the Treaty of Lausanne, which did not include any provisions for criminal prosecutions. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 540-41. Treaty of Peace with
Turkey Signed at Lausanne, Jul. 24, 1923, available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/-rdh/
wwi/1918p/lausanne.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
32. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 541. See also Declaration of Amnesty, and
Protocol, Jul. 24, 1923, art. III, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/
treaties/1924/13.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). The Declaration provided that "[n]o
person" was to be "disturbed or molested ... on account of any military or political
action taken by him" between 1914 and 1922. Id., art. II. At the same time, a "[f]ull
and complete amnesty" was to be granted for "all crimes or offenses committed
during the same period which were evidently connected with the political events
which have taken place ..... Id., art. III.
33. See Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference,
Mar. 29, 1919, reprintedin DOCUMENTS AND CASES, supra note 15, at 37 [hereinafter
Report of the Commission].
34. See Report of the Commission, reprintedin DOCUMENTS AND CASES, supra
note 15, at 40, 42-44, 46-48. Some variation on the phrase "laws of humanity" appears at least ten times in the report, which is only twelve pages long (excluding
Annexes).
35. See Report of the Commission, Annex II, reprinted in DOCUMENTS AND
CASES, supra note 15, at 53.
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The Commission's references to the "laws of humanity" are
important because the Report is explicitly a legal document. The

Commission members were reporting on the crimes they believed had been committed during World War I and proposing
how to prosecute individuals for those crimes. The inclusion of
the "the laws of humanity" as a third basis for liability, alongside

the laws of war and the customs of war, is of real significance.
Ultimately, the Commission recommended that the law to be applied by the tribunal would be "the principles of the laws of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. '36 Unfortunately, it was still not clear how the
"laws of humanity" and the "dictates of public conscience" were
to be defined. The Commission did provide a list of thirty-two
types of crimes it believed were committed; 37 however, it did not
indicate which crimes it believed were violations of the laws of
war, which were violations of the customs of war, and which were
violations of the "laws of humanity, ' 38 making it very difficult to
know how the Commission intended to define the "laws of

humanity." 39

The recommendations contained in the Commission's Re-

port were not acted on, in part, because the American represent40
atives on the Commission refused to endorse the report.
Amongst other things, the Americans argued that the Report
inappropriately attempted to expand the laws and customs of war
because the "laws of humanity" were "moral offenses" not legal
prohibitions and there was no acceptable definition of the "laws
36. Id. This language is taken from the Martens Clause. See Convention (IV),
supra note 15.
37. See Report of the Commission, ch. II, reprintedin DOCUMENTS AND CASES,
supra note 15, at 41-42.
38. The reference to "dictates of public conscience" appears to have been included in the recommendation about the jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal because it was part of the Martens Clause, but it does not figure prominently in the
Report, and there is no suggestion elsewhere in the Report that the Commissioners
believed that violating the "dictates of public conscience" was a punishable crime.
39. While Bassiouni argues that the Commission's Report "clearly expressed
recognition for the fact that 'laws of humanity' did exist, could be ascertained, and
could be breached" he does not try to guess how the Commissioners would have
defined laws of humanity. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 539, 537-39. One possibility is that a definition can be arrived at by process of elimination. If one were to
eliminate the crimes that are violations of the laws and customs of war, presumably
what would be left would constitute the "laws of humanity." Unfortunately, almost
all of the thirty-two crimes listed by the Commission were already a violation of the
laws and customs of war, which suggests that crimes against humanity added little, if
anything, to the existing prohibitions.
40. See Report of the Commission, Annex II, reprinted in DOCUMENTS AND
CASES, supra note 15, at 49-54 (containing the reasons for the American representatives' refusal to endorse the Commission's recommendations).
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of humanity" that could form the basis for prosecution. 41 The
Japanese representative also objected to42 the Report of the Commission for many of the same reasons.
When the Treaty of Versailles was signed in June 1919, the
American objections seemed to have carried the day. The treaty
contained provisions for prosecuting German military personnel
for "violations of the laws and customs of war," 43 but did not
include jurisdiction over violations of the "laws of humanity."
However, even this more limited undertaking was eventually
frustrated, as the Allies consented to having the trials take place
in Germany where the vast majority of alleged war criminals
were never tried at all. 44
C.

WORLD WAR

II AND THE INTERNATIONAL

MILITARY TRIBUNAL

(IMT)

While there were attempts to further develop international
criminal law in the period between World War I and World War
II, none of these efforts resulted in anything concrete. 45 The
sheer scale of the atrocities that took place during World War II
forced a change, 46 affecting virtually all aspects of the laws and
41. Id. at 50, 52-53 (arguing that the laws of humanity were primarily moral
offenses, that as legal offenses they would be "uncertain" and would vary "according
to the conception of the members of the high court" and objecting to "declaring the
laws and principles of humanity as a standard whereby the acts of their enemies
should be measured and punished by a judicial tribunal").
42. See Report of the Commission, Annex III, reprinted in DOCUMENTS AND
CASES, supra note 15, at 54-55.
43. See Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, concluded at Versailles June 18, 1919, available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/
-rdh/wwi/versailles.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2006) [herinafter Treaty of Peace].
Article 228 stated that the "German Government recognises the right of the Allied
and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having
committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war."
44. See Bierzanek, supra note 8, at 92-94. The attempt to try the ex-Kaiser was
frustrated by the Netherland's refusal to extradite him. Id. at 92.
45. See Antonio Cassese, From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military
Tribunals to the International Criminal Court, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 4-5 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds.,
2002). See also Bierzanek, supra note 8, at 96.
See Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Crimes Against Humanity, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL

ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

LAW, COMMENTARY

145,

145-46 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000) (noting that
the phrase "crimes against peace and humanity" was used to condemn Italian atrocities committed during the Italo-Abyssinian War of 1935-1936, while the destruction
of neutral shipping during the Spanish Civil War was condemned as contrary to "the
most elementary dictates of humanity"). This language is similar to that which had
been used previously in documents like the Declaration of St. Petersburg, the Martens Clause, and the 1915 Joint Declaration, but the condemnations apparently did
not result in any formal legal proceedings for violations of the laws of humanity.
46. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 562 ("Never before had such atrocities occurred on such a scale, and for as long a time as those which occurred during World
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customs that regulate the use of force. It had an impact on the
rules governing when force could be used, resulting in the creation of the United Nations and the establishment of a universal
prohibition on the use of force in international relations 4 7 and
the rules on how combatants and non-combatants should be
treated, resulting in the Geneva Conventions of 1949.48 It also
influenced international criminal law and resulted in the first
modern international tribunal with authority to try individuals
for violations of the laws and customs of war.
Throughout World War II, the Allies stated that they in49
tended to punish those individuals responsible for war crimes.
Work began on a process for trying war criminals in late 1943,
with the creation of a United Nations Commission for the investigation of war crimes. 50 The work of the Commission
culminated in the London Agreement of August 8, 1945.51 The
London Agreement created the International Military Tribunal
("IMT") to try "major war criminals. ' 52 The IMT adopted many
War II. The discovery of these atrocities toward the end of the war left little time for
deliberate reflections due to the tremendous political and public pressure to bring
those responsible to justice quickly."). See also Bierzanek, supra note 8, at 106
("[T]he crimes of the Germans and Japanese during World War II, which reached
dimensions unparalleled in human history, so immensely shocked world public opinion that the punishment of war criminals came to be regarded among the most urgent problems to be solved after the war."); Cassese, supra note 45, at 5-6 ("It took
the full extent of the atrocities committed during World War I ....to jolt the international community out of its complacency.").
47. See Ford, supra note 6, at 78-79.
48. See Green, supra note 6, at 371 (noting that the Geneva Conventions I, II,
and III largely filled in gaps in the laws of war that became apparent during World
War II, while Geneva Convention IV substantially expanded the protections accorded to civilians during armed conflicts, "an issue which had become of supreme
concern in the light of German practice in occupied Europe").
49. See Beirzanek, supra note 8, at 97-98 (describing the various statements of
the Allied nations regarding their intention to try Axis war criminals). Perhaps the
most famous of these statements was the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943,
which warned that the Allies would "pursue persons responsible for war crimes to
the uttermost ends of the earth and deliver them to the accusers in order that justice
[would] be done." Id. at 97 (quoting the Moscow Declaration). The Moscow Declaration was expressly referenced in the Preamble to the London Agreement. See
infra note 51.
50. See Bierzanek, supra note 8, at 98.
51. See Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the
Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, reprinted in DOCUMENTS AND CASES,
supra note 15, at 59-67 [hereinafter London Agreement].
52. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal [hereinafter IMT Charter] was attached to the London Agreement as an annex and made a part of the
Agreement. See London Agreement, art. 2, reprinted in DOCUMENTS AND CASES,
supra note 15, at 59 ("The constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the International Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter annexed to this Agree-
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of the recommendations found in the 1919 Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War. 53 The
IMT was a fully international tribunal that applied international
law. 54 It did away with the head of state defense,5 5 and it created
56 which
a category of crimes (called "crimes against humanity")
'57
humanity.
of
"laws
the
was the successor to
Article 6 of the IMT Charter defines three crimes that would

fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal: 1) crimes against
peace; 2) war crimes; and 3) crimes against humanity. While war
crimes, defined as "violations of the laws or customs of war,"
were relatively uncontroversial, 58 both crimes against peace and
crimes against humanity caused controversy. The inclusion of
crimes against peace, defined as planning, preparing or initiating

a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties,
was viewed by some as a violation of the principle of legality be-

cause it had not clearly been prohibited prior to World War 11.59
ment, which Charter shall form an integral part of this Agreement."). The London
Agreement variously refers to the people to be charged as "war criminals whose
offenses have no particular geographical location" and "major war criminals." See
London Agreement, arts. 1, 3.
53. See supra notes 33-36.
54. It was created by an international agreement between the four signatories to
the London Agreement: the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. See London Agreement, Preamble. Moreover, the signatories indicated that they were "acting in the interests of all the United Nations."
Id. Ultimately, nineteen other countries formally adhered to the London Agreement. See DOCUMENTS AND CASES, supra note 15, at 60 n.1. The Tribunal was composed of judges from each of the signatories, who sat together to form a single multinational panel. See IMT Charter, arts. 2-4. It adopted its own rules of procedure
and evidence, not those of the signatories' national systems. Id., arts. 13, 19. Moreover, it had jurisdiction over international crimes, including "violations of the laws or
customs of war," violations of international treaties and obligations, and "crimes
against humanity." Id., art. 6. The Allies certainly intended to create an international tribunal. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 543 (noting that Allies intended the
IMT to be an international tribunal for the most serious war criminals and also set
up national tribunals to try lesser war criminals). Moreover, the IMT stated in its
Judgment that it was applying international law. See infra note 75.
55. IMT Charter, art. 7 ("The official position of defendants, whether as Heads
of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment.").
56. IMT Charter, art. 6(c) (defining "crimes against humanity").
57. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 548 (noting that crimes against humanity were
the "progeny" of the earlier references to the laws of humanity and the Allies' joint
declaration condemning the Armenian massacres during World War I); id. at 551
(noting that the French delegation, in particular, pushed for a close link between
crimes against humanity and the references to the laws of humanity from the 1919
Commission Report).
58. See Treaty of Peace supra note 43. The Treaty of Versailles had established
in 1919 that violations of the "laws and customs of war" could lead to criminal
prosecution.
59. For example, the Commission on responsibility for WWI noted in 1919 that,
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arguments were raised against "crimes against humanSimilar
ity,"6 ° as it had been unclear at the end of World War I, and in
the years between the wars, whether the "laws of humanity"
were sufficiently definite and accepted to give rise to criminal
were summarily dismissed, largely
liability. 61 These arguments
62
for political reasons.
Crimes against humanity was defined as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of63 the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
A plain reading of this language suggests that crimes against humanity is comprised of two independent subparts-a prohibition
science reproves ... by reason of the purely optional character of the institutions at
The Hague for the maintenance of peace ... a war of aggression may not be considSee Report of the Commission,
ered as an act directly contrary to positive law ....
ch. IV(a), reprintedin DOCUMENTS AND CASES, supra note 15, at 44. The KelloggBriand Pact (1928) closed some of the gaps in the prohibition on the use of force in
international relations, but still left loopholes. See Ford, supra note 6, at 76-78
(describing the evolution of the prohibition on the use of force between World War I
and World War II). Prior to the IMT, it was not at all clear that wars of aggression
were illegal and could give rise to criminal liability. See Green, supra note 6, at 369
(noting that "criticism may be directed at the manner in which the Tribunal concluded that the [Kellogg-Briand] Pact ... had made resort to 'aggressive' war an
international crime"). See also Bierzanek, supra note 8, at 100 (noting that the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not contain any sanctions for its violations or any mechanism
for its enforcement). The IMT avoided the problems presented by the lack of any
criminal provisions in the Kellogg-Briand Pact by concluding that violations of international law give rise to individual criminal responsibility even in the absence of
specific criminal provisions related to the breach. Id. at 100.
60. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 543-546 (describing the problems presented by
the principle of legality). ld. at 546 ("The drafters were mindful of the importance
of the principles of legality but their concern was how to avoid its application in a
rigid manner which would have precluded the inclusion in the Charter of 'crimes
against peace' and would have caused difficulties with 'crimes against humanity.'").
See also Cassese, supra note 45, at 8 (noting that the inclusion of crimes against
humanity and crimes against peace was criticized on the grounds that these crimes
had not existed prior to 1945). Cf. Lamb, infra note 381, at 736 (concluding that
crimes against humanity, as defined by the Charter of the IMT, represented new
international law).
61. See supra notes 40-45.
62. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 547 (noting that the creation of the IMT was
the result of political and legal compromises that were necessary to gain agreement
amongst the participants). In particular, a decision was made that the legal process
had to be "fair" but "swift," and that "no technical legal argument could be allowed
to prevail and result in dismissal of the charges or acquittal .... " Id. "The facts
were to drive the law and the proceedings would be based on the facts, rejecting
legalistic considerations." Id. at 548. In the end, the trials were designed to have
"the appearance of legality and fairness" but to reach a "preordained" result. Id.
63. IMT Charter, art. 6(c).
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on "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before
or during the war" and a prohibition on "persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal . ..."

However, while there is not much documentary evidence regarding the creation of the definition of crimes against humanity,64 the plain reading described above is incorrect. Slightly less
than one month after the London Agreement was signed, the
four signatories to the IMT Charter signed the October 6th Protocol, which clarified a "discrepancy" in the definition of crimes
against humanity. 65 First, the October 6th Protocol removed the
semicolon between "war" and "or" in the English text of Article
6(c) that seemed 66
to separate crimes against humanity into two
separate subparts.

The October 6th Protocol also substantively amended the
French text of the Charter to better reflect the Allies' intent. By
virtue of this amendment, the French text became the authoritative version. 67 In the amended French text, the phrase "in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal" clearly modifies both subparts of the definition of
crimes against humanity. 68 As a result, a proper reading of Arti64. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 556 (noting the absence of records and suggesting that the lack of records was part of a deliberate policy of the drafters of the
London Agreement to deprive defense counsel of evidence that acknowledged the
possibility that crimes against humanity violated the principle of legality).
65. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume I: Protocol Rectifying Discrepancy in
the Charter (Oct. 6, 1945), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/
imtprot.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2006) [hereinafter October 6th Protocol].
66. October 6th Protocol, supra note 65. ("[T]he undersigned, signatories of the
said Agreement on behalf of their respective Governments, duly authorized thereto,
have agreed that Article 6, paragraph (c), of the Charter in the Russian text is correct, and that the meaning and intention of the Agreement and Charter require that
the said semicolon in the English text should be changed to a comma. ...").
67. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 553 ("The new French wording of Article
6(c) is the mo[st] important and decisive in view of the fact that it is contained not
only in the French, but also in the English and Russian[ ] texts of the [ ] Protocol, so
that it is clear that all four Contracting parties have agreed that the text, as it is
declared in the amended French wording, correctly reproduces the meaning of the
Agreement and the intention of all four Parties.") (quoting Egon Schwelb, Crimes
Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 195 (1946)).
68. October 6th Protocol, supra note 65. The Protocol amended the French text
of Article 6(c) to read: "Les Crimes Contre L'Humanite: c'est a dire l'assassinat,
l'extermination, la reduction en esclavage, la deportation, et tout autre acte inhumain commis contre toutes populations civiles, avant ou pendant la guerre, ou
bien les persecutions pour des motifs politiques, raciaux, ou religieux, lorsque ces
actes ou persecutions, qu'ils aient constitue ou non une violation du droit interne du
pays ou ils ont ete perpetres, ont ete commis a la suite de tout crime rentrant dans la
competence du Tribunal, ou en liaison avec ce crime." Id.
The key change is to the phrase "lorsque ces actes ou persecutions ... ont ete
commis a la suite de tout crime rentrant dans la competence du Tribunal, ou en
HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 142 2006-2007
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cle 6(c) demonstrates that both subparts required a connection
with one of the other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 69 To put it another way, under the IMT Charter, crimes
against humanity could not exist except in conjunction with ei70
ther war crimes or a crime against peace.
The final Judgment of the IMT reflects this understanding of
crimes against humanity. 71 The IMT acknowledged that a "policy of persecution, repression, and murder of civilians" occurred
before the beginning of the war in 1939. It similarly stated that
the "persecution of Jews during the same period is established
beyond all doubt. ' 72 Nevertheless, the IMT concluded that
crimes against humanity could only have occurred after the outbreak of war in 1939 because they require a connection to war:
To constitute Crimes against Humanity, the acts relied on
before the outbreak of war must have been in execution of, or
in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily
proved that they were done in execution of, or in connection
with, any such crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a
general declaration that the acts before 1939 were Crimes
Against Humanity within the meaning of the Charter, but
from the beginning of the war in 1939 War Crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also Crimes Against Humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts charged in the
Indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, did
not constitute War Crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive
73 war, and therefore constituted Crimes against Humanity.
liaison avec ce crime." In English, this translates as "when these acts or persecutions
... were committed as part of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or in
connection with such a crime." "These acts" is a reference to the "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts" described in the first
subpart of the definition. Consequently, it is clear from the French text that the
requirement of a connection with a war modifies both subparts of the definition of
crimes against humanity.
69. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 552-55 (describing the impact of the October 6th
Protocol on the interpretation of Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter); id. at 553 ("[I]t is
now beyond doubt that the qualification 'in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal' undoubtedly applies to the whole context of the paragraph and constitutes a very important restriction on the scope of the
concept of crimes against humanity.") (quoting Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT Y.B. OF INT'L L. 178, 195 (1946)).
70. Green, supra note 6, at 369 ("[A]s defined in both the Charter and the Judgment, crimes against humanity were only committed if they were part and parcel of
the war of aggression or of war crimes.").
71. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences,
INT'L L. 172, 249 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment).
72. Id.
73. Id.

41 AM. J.
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While there were plausible arguments that the new articulation of the crime of "crimes against humanity" violated the principle of legality,7 4 the IMT dismissed all such suggestions. In the

view of the Tribunal, the IMT Charter was not an "arbitrary exercise of power," but represented "the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation. ' 75 This may have
been a stretch when applied to crimes against humanity, but the
IMT Charter did have the effect
of finally providing a definition
76
of crimes against humanity.
The IMT's definition was tied to the traditional laws and

customs of war because it required that crimes against humanity
be committed in connection with either war crimes or an aggressive war. One could not be convicted of crimes against humanity
in the absence of a war. This is not surprising because, as noted
earlier, crimes against humanity evolved out of the traditional
laws and customs of war in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 77 It is clear from the Judgment of the Tribunal that

the IMT viewed crimes against humanity as a subsidiary of traditional war crimes. 78 As one leading scholar has written, the Al74. See supra notes 60-62.
75. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 71, at 216. The Tribunal was on safest
ground when it argued that the war crimes articulated in Article 6(b) merely stated
existing international law. Id. at 248. The Tribunal also made an effort to justify the
prohibition on aggressive war by relying on the Kellogg-Briand Pact and similar
statements that had been made renouncing war "as an instrument of national policy." Id. at 217-20. However, the Tribunal made no effort to justify its conclusion
that crimes against humanity represented existing international law. Id. at 248-49.
Instead, the Tribunal noted that it was "bound by the Charter" in defining crimes
against humanity and added that the crimes against humanity that had been committed were also punishable as war crimes. Id. at 248, 249. The failure to articulate an
argument that crimes against humanity represented existing international law appears to be a tacit admission that such an argument would have been unconvincing.
76. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 71, at 216. Indeed, the Tribunal seems
to hint at this when it suggests that the IMT Charter not only represents existing
international law but also "is itself a contribution to international law." See also
Cassese, supra note 45, at 8 (noting that while crimes against humanity and crimes
against peace may have violated the principles of legality in 1945, as the result of the
WWII tribunals they did become customary international law).
77. Supra Section II(A). See also Bassiouni, supra note 8,at 545 ("I[T]he historical-legal foundation of 'Crimes Against Humanity' is found in international humanitarian law and in the normative aspects of the international regulation of armed
conflicts.").
78. The Tribunal devoted four pages to its discussion of the existence of a prohibition on aggressive war. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 71, at 217-20. By contrast, the legal basis for crimes against humanity was not treated separately but
subsumed within the discussion of war crimes. See id. at 248. Even within the discussion of the legal basis for war crimes, it is relegated to a single paragraph at the
very end of the discussion. Id. at 249.
More than twenty pages were spent detailing the evidence of Germany's aggressive wars. See id. at 186-214. Similarly, more than twenty pages were devoted to a
detailed discussion of the evidence of war crimes. See id. at 224-47. The evidence
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lies and the IMT judges treated crimes against humanity as
"simply an extension of war crimes ....,,79
D.

THE OTHER WORLD WAR

II

WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS

While the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg is
the best known and most influential of the World War II tribunals, it was not the only one. In fact, it only tried a limited number of the most senior German war criminals. Several other
tribunals were set up to try other classes of offenders, including
the courts set up under Control Council Law No. 10 that operated in the Allied Zones in occupied Germany, and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) at Tokyo,
which tried Japanese leaders. The IMT at Nuremberg had the
most impact on the law of crimes against humanity, both because
it was first and because it was the best-known, but the other
tribunals must be considered as well. All three of these structures defined crimes against humanity slightly differently, as the
definitions appear to have been tailored to the specific character
of the conflict, as well as to the needs of the victors.
1.

The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals

Just a few months after the IMT Charter was created by the
Allied governments, General Douglas MacArthur issued the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(hereafter "IMTFE Charter").8 0 Unlike the London Agreement,
the IMTFE Charter was not signed by the governments of the
81
Allied powers; it was essentially an American undertaking,
for crimes against humanity, on the other hand, is not separately discussed, although
the Tribunal does treat the "persecution of the Jews" in a separate subsection within
its discussion of the evidence of war crimes. Id. at 243-47. Ultimately, the Tribunal
suggested that the evidence for crimes against humanity was essentially the same as
that supporting the charges of war crimes. Id. at 249.
Susan Lamb has suggested that the Tribunal may have intentionally blurred the
distinctions between war crimes and crimes against humanity in order to blunt criticisms that crimes against humanity violated the principle of legality. See Lamb, infra
note 381, at 737.
79. Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 545. See also Swaak-Goldman, supra note 45, at
148.

80. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, dated
Jan. 19, 1946, reprinted in DOCUMENTS AND CASES, supra note 15, at 73-77 [hereinafter IMTFE Charter]. See also Cassese, supra note 45, at 7 (describing the creation of
the IMTFE); Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 566-67 (describing the creation of the
IMTFE).
81. See Cassese, supra note 45, at 7 n.14 (noting that the IMTFE Charter was
drafted by the American military and the other Allies were consulted only after it
had been issued); Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 566.

HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 145 2006-2007

PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 24:125

modeled on the IMT at Nuremberg. 82 In particular, it included

crimes against humanity within its jurisdiction, and used a definition that was almost identical to that used by the IMT. 83 The
only significant difference between the two definitions is that the
IMTFE omits religious persecution from its definition of crimes
against humanity.8 4 Ultimately, the IMTFE's definition of
crimes against humanity is so similar to the IMT's definition that
it added little to what the IMT had already established with re-

gard to crimes against humanity.
2.

Trials of "Lesser" War Criminals in Europe

The Nuremberg Tribunal only tried a handful of the most
senior German leaders. The Allies also needed a way to deal
with the larger number of lower ranking Germans who were believed to have been responsible for various crimes during World
War II. They could not use the German court system because
they had already dissolved the German government and assumed
direct control of the country. 85 This had been accomplished by
dividing Germany into separate American, British, French and
Soviet Zones. Each occupying country established its own military government in its Zone, but the Allies also created a Control
Council, composed of one representative from each Zone, to
deal with issues that affected the whole country.8 6 One of the
82. See Cassese, supra note 45, at 7-8; Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 566 (noting
that the IMTFE Charter was "substantially the same" as the IMT Charter).
83. See IMTFE Charter, supra note 80, art. 5(c) (defining crimes against humanity). See also Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 566-67 (noting similarities in how the IMT
and the IMTFE defined crimes against humanity).
84. The IMT prohibited "persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds
See .....
IMT Charter, Art. 6(c). By contrast, the IMTFE prohibited only "persecutions on political or racial grounds .... ." See IMTFE Charter, supra note 80, art.
5(c). Religious persecution is not included. It has been suggested that religious persecution was omitted because "the Nazi crimes against Jews did not have a counterpart in the Asian conflict." See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 567. The omission does
not seem to have impacted the IMTFE's ability to prosecute Japanese war criminals.
85. See Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of
Supreme Authority by Allied Powers, dated Jun. 5, 1945, available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/ger0l.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2006). The Declaration states that the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union assumed "supreme authority" over Germany, "including all the powers possessed by
the German Government .....Id., Preamble. It goes on to state that the Allies had
the power to "issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions" as necessary
to implement the provisions of the Declaration. Id., art. 13. All Germans, whether
civilian or military, were required to carry out those instructions "unconditionally."
Id.
86. See The Berlin (Potsdam) Conference: Protocol of the Proceedings, dated
Aug. 1, 1945, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decadel7.htm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2006). The Potsdam Conference established that "supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments,
by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America,
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purposes of the Control Council was to arrest and try "[w]ar
criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war
crimes. ' 87 This goal was implemented through the promulgation
of Control Council Law No. 10, which provided a mechanism for
trying the88 so-called "lesser" war criminals in occupied
Germany.
Control Council Law No. 10 contains the three main crimes
that were present in the IMT Charter-war crimes, crimes
against peace and crimes against humanity. 89 However, each
crime is defined slightly differently than in the Charter. The
changes seem to have been made in an attempt to expand the
scope of the crimes. For example, language about "including but
not limited to" was inserted in each of the crimes. Crimes against
humanity were also modified to include imprisonment, torture
and rape in the list of prohibited acts, 90 even though those acts
prohibited by the IMT's reference to
would already have been
"other inhumane acts." 91 Finally, the definition of crimes against
humanity was changed to remove the phrase "in execution of or
in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," which appeared in the IMT Charter. This is the most signifconnection to
icant change, as it appears to remove the required
92
either a war crime or a crime against peace.
The expanded scope of the definitions has led to debates
about whether Control Council Law No. 10 was meant to be an
expression of international or domestic law. The law refers to
the IMT Charter and purports to integrate its provisions, 93 which
suggests the crimes have an international character. At least one
of the courts created under the law concluded that it was applying international law. 94 On the other hand, the law was promulgated by the Control Council acting in its capacity as the
the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting
Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council." Id.,
Section II(A)(1).
87. Id., Section II(A)(5).
88. See Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity dated Dec. 20, 1945, available
at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imtlO.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2006)
[hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10].
89. See Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 88, art. II(1).
90. Compare IMT Charter, art. 6(c), with Control Council Law No. 10, supra
note 88, art. II(1)(c).
91. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 564.
92. Id. at 564.

93. See Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 88, art. I.
94. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 564 (quoting the decision in The Justice
Case).
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government of Germany. 95 Moreover, the law was intended to
have effect only in Germany, which suggests a domestic character. 96 Regardless of how Control Council Order No. 10 should be
viewed, in the immediate aftermath of WWII the IMT's definition of crimes against humanity was viewed as the most accepted
statement of international 97law, including the requirement of a
nexus with armed conflict.
E.

THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I1-CODIFYING THE

LEGACY OF NUREMBURG

The newly-formed United Nations wasted no time in working to solidify the legacy of Nuremberg. 98 In Resolution 95(I) of
December 11, 1946, the General Assembly affirmed the "principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuirmberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal." 99 However, the General Assembly did not try to articulate those principles. Instead, the General Assembly asked the Committee on
the Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification, which was created that very same day, to formulate the
Nuremberg Principles. 10 0
The Committee met throughout the first half of 1947 and
eventually prepared a report which recommended establishing a
permanent International Law Commission to advise the General
Assembly. 10 1 In November of 1947, the General Assembly
agreed, and the International Law Commission (ILC), a body of
experts ("persons of recognized competence in international
95. See supra notes 85-86.
96. See Control Council Law No. 10, Preamble (stating that the law was designed to establish a legal basis for the prosecution of war criminals "in Germany").
Article IV of the law states that "[w]hen any person in a Zone in Germany is alleged
to have committed a crime... in a country other than Germany" that person is to be
transferred to the third country for trial. Id., art. IV. The clear implication is that
the courts created under Control Council Law No. 10 did not have jurisdiction over
crimes committed outside the territory of Germany. If they were truly international
courts, they would have had jurisdiction over war crimes committed outside
Germany.

97. See infra notes 112-17, 121-23.
98. For example, its third resolution was a call to member states to extradite and
punish war criminals in accordance with the IMT Charter. See G.A. Res. 3(1) (Feb.
13, 1946), available at http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm.
99. G.A. Res. 95(1) (Dec. 11, 1946).

100. G.A. Res. 94(I) (Dec. 11, 1946) (creating a committee to study "the methods by which the General Assembly should encourage the progressive development
of international law and its eventual codification"); G.A. Res. 95(I) (Dec. 11, 1946)
(directing the Committee to formulate the Nuremberg principles).
101. See Formulation of Nuremberg Principles, Report by J. Spiropoulos, Apr.
12, 1950, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, L. 181, 188 30 (1950). The document is available in electronic form at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/
english/acn4-22.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).

HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 148 2006-2007

20071

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

law") which provides advice on the codification and development
10 2 was created. 10 3
of international law to the General Assembly,
The ILC took over work on the Nuremberg Principles. 10 4
The ILC met to discuss the formulation of the Nuremberg
Principles in 1949.105 Drafting work was done within a Sub Committee of the ILC and draft principles were discussed by the
whole Commission. 10 6 The draft principles followed the definition of crimes against humanity contained in the Charter of the
IMT, including the connection with war crimes or crimes against
peace. 10 7 At the end of the ILC's first session, the Commission
decided to refer the draft to a rapporteur for further work. In his
report, the Rapporteur recommended adopting a definition of
crimes against humanity that was worded slightly differently
from the one used in the Charter of the IMT, but which retained
the requirement of a connection between crimes against humanity and either war crimes or crimes against peace.' 0 8 He acknowledged that according to the Charter of the IMT, crimes
against humanity were an international crime only if they were
committed in connection with either war crimes or crimes against
peace but argued that the IMT had "applied article 6(c) in a very
restrictive way."' 1 9 The Rapporteur also suggested the Judgment
of the IMT had not precluded the possibility that a broader definition of crimes against humanity (one that did not require a connection with war crimes or crimes against peace) might exist
outside of the Charter of the IMT. 110
102. See Statute of the International Law Commission, arts. 1, 2 & 16, attached
to G.A. Res. 174(111) (Nov. 21, 1947).
103. G.A. Res. 174(111) (Nov. 21, 1947).
104. G.A. Res. 177(111) (Nov. 21, 1947) (delegating the task of formulating the
Nuremberg Principles to the International Law Commission). See generally Origin
and Background of the Development and Codification of International Law at notes
11-14, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2006)
(describing the formation of the International Law Commission).
105. See Report of the International Law Commission on its First Session, dated
Apr. 12, 1949, available in 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 278 (1949). The document is
available in electronic form at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/acn4_13 corrl-3.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
106. Id.
28.
107. Formulation of the Principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal, available in 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 183,
183 60 (1949) (noting that the Sub Committee's draft "followed closely" the provisions of article 6 of the Charter of the IMT and that the Sub Committee had
"adopted" the IMT's definition of crimes against humanity "without any modification"). The document is available in electronic form at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
documentation/english/acn4_w6.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). See also Formulation of Nuremberg Principles, supra note 101, at 189-90 40 (quoting the Sub Committee's definition of crimes against humanity).
108. Id. at 194.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 194 n.65.
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The Rapporteur's report was considered by the ILC in June
of 1950.111 His suggestion that crimes against humanity might
not require a connection with crimes against peace or war crimes
was immediately questioned by the members of the ILC. 112 Several members of the ILC spoke against the Rapporteur's suggestion. The Brazilian representative argued that if the acts
described in the definition were not connected with war crimes
or crimes against peace, then they were not international crimes
at all but merely "common crimes. '' " 3 The Mexican representative "thought the solution would be to consider that crimes
against humanity committed without any connexion with war
were not crimes under international law, but crimes under domestic law," 114 and the U.S. representative agreed. 115 The Panamanian representative concurred, stating that the "end of the
paragraph [stating the required connection with war crimes or
crimes against peace] was necessary to make them crimes under
116
international law."'
As a result of the debate, the ILC decided to keep the requirement of a connection with armed conflict in the definition
of crimes against humanity and to delete the Rapporteur's footnote, which suggested that crimes against humanity might not require such a connection. 117 Ultimately, the ILC adopted the
following definition of crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Principles:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other
inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts
are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or
in conne[ct]ion
with any crime against peace or any war
8
crime."
The commentary that accompanies the definition stresses that
crimes against humanity could occur outside of armed conflicts,
111. See Summary of the 48th Meeting of the ILC, Jun. 16, 1950, available in 1

Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 51 (1950). The document is also available in electronic form
at http://untreaty.un.orglilc/documentation/english/a
26, 2006).
112. Id. at 55-58.
113. Id. at 56 1 94-95, 113.
114. Id. at 57
113.

cn4_sr48.pdf (last visited Apr.

115. Id. at 56 95 (arguing that the acts listed in the definition of crimes against
humanity could not be considered crimes under international law if they were not
connected to either war crimes or crimes against peace).
116. Id. at 56 T 103.

117. Id. at 58 IT 126, 130-33.
118. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on
its Second Session, availablein 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 364, 377 (1950). The document is also available in electronic form at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/
english/acn4.34.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
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but only if they are committed in connection with a crime against
peace. 119

The General Assembly, upon receiving the ILC's Nuremberg Principles, invited the member states to comment on

them.1 20 In the debate that followed, the French delegation took

the position that crimes against humanity existed in international
law separate from the Charter of the IMT. According to the

French, this underlying principle of crimes against humanity was
broader than the one described in the IMT Charter and did not
require a connection with armed conflict. 12 1 Israel supported the

French position, 12 2 but it was opposed by the majority of the
delegates.123
The debate between ILC members and amongst member
states of the United Nations about the Nuremberg Principles
demonstrates that it was generally accepted that a connection
with war was a substantive element of crimes against humanity in
the early 1950s. The connection with war made what would otherwise be crimes only punishable under national laws into crimes

in international law. 124 This acceptance was not universal, but
the definition of crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Principles appears to have accurately captured the state of customary
international law in 1951 and for some time afterwards.
119. Id. at 377
122-23.
120. See G.A. Res. 488(V) (Dec. 12, 1950). The General Assembly carefully refrained form saying it agreed with the ILC's Nuremberg Principles. Id. ("Considering that the International Law Commission has formulated certain principles
recognized, according to the Commission, in the charter and judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and that many delegates have made observations during the fifth
session of the General Assembly on this formulation.").
121. See Second Report on a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind by Mr. J. Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur, dated Apr. 12, 1951,
availablein 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 44, 55 118 (1951). This document is available
in electronic form at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a-cn4-44.pdf
(last visited Apr. 26, 2006). See also Observations of Governments of Member
States relating to the Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles prepared by the International Law Commission, dated Apr. 19, 1951, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. 104,
109 (1951) (criticizing the ILC for requiring a connection between crimes against
humanity and war crimes).
122. See Second Report on a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, supra note 121, at 56 124. See also Summary Record of the
90th Meeting of the ILC, dated May 28, 1951 available in 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
63, 70 (1951) (noting that France had criticized the definition of crimes against humanity as being too narrow, but that the other delegations had not supported that
view). The document is available in electronic form at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
documentation/english/a cn4 sr9O.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
123. See Second Report on a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, supra note 121, at 55-56
116, 120, 121, 123.
124. See supra notes 113-16.
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F.

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION OF

1948

The Nuremberg Principles were not the only attempt to codify the legacy of WWII. In 1946, the United Nations General
Assembly affirmed that genocide, described as "the denial of the
right of existence of entire human groups," was "a crime under
international law which the civilized world condemns. ' 125 The
General Assembly asked the Economic and Social Council to
draw up a convention prohibiting genocide. Drafting work was
done on the convention throughout 1947 and was submitted to
the General Assembly in late 1948.126 The General Assembly
unanimously adopted the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the Genocide
Convention), 127 making it illegal to commit any of the enumerated acts on members of a national, racial, ethnical, or religious
group, with the intent of destroying that group "in whole or in
28
part."1
Genocide is a subset of crimes against humanity-it covers
many of the same physical acts, but requires a very specific intent
that was not part of the definition of crimes against humanity as
used by the IMT. Article I of the Genocide Convention states
that genocide is a crime "whether committed in time of peace or
in time of war. 1 29 The language was added during the drafting
process to clarify that genocide was not limited to acts committed
during armed conflict. 130 Therefore, the Genocide Convention
makes it clear that after 1948 at least one form of crime against
humanity-genocide-was no longer explicitly linked to armed
conflicts.
However, it did not change the general requirement of a
connection to armed conflict for crimes against humanity other
than genocide. The ILC's Nuremberg Principles were formulated three years after the Genocide Convention, demonstrating
that, even several years after the Genocide Convention, the gen125. G.A. Res. 96(I) (Dec. 11, 1946).
126. See Matthew Lippman, Genocide, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW,
CRIMES 589-615,595 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) (describing WWII prose-

cutions for genocide and their impact on the genesis of the Genocide Convention).
127. See G.A. Res. 260(111) (Dec. 9, 1948) (containing the Genocide Convention

as an annex).
128. Genocide Convention, art. II, in DOCUMENTS AND CASES, supra note 15, at
83-85. The enumerated acts are: 1) killing members of the group; 2) causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 3) deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part; 4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or 5)
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Id.
129. Genocide Convention, art. I, in DOCUMENTS AND CASES, supra note 15, at

83.
130. See Matthew Lippman, supra note 126, at 596.
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erally-accepted definition of crimes against humanity required a
connection with armed conflict.1 3 1 Thus, the Genocide Convention removed the requirement of a nexus for genocide but did
not alter the nexus requirement for the rest of crimes against
humanity.

G. THE 1950's - THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
WORK ON THE DRAFT CODE OF OFFENSES AGAINST
THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND

As originally envisaged by the General Assembly, the for-

mulation of the Nuremberg Principles was merely the first step in
the process of drafting a code of "offences against the peace and
132

security of mankind or of an International Criminal Code."

When the International Law Commission was created in late
1947, the
work of drafting a code of offences was assigned to the
3
ILC.

13

The ILC has two principal roles: 1) the codification of existing international law; and 2) the progressive development of
new international law. 1 34 The drafting of the new code of offences would be an example of the ILC's progressive development of new international law. 135 Consequently, the Rapporteur
took the position that ILC should not necessarily be bound by

the Nuremberg Principles (which were an attempt to codify existing international law). Rather, the ILC should be willing to
36
expand, contract, or modify the Nuremberg Principles.'
The Rapporteur's initial draft of offences placed crimes
against humanity, as defined in the Charter of the IMT, and genocide, as defined in the Genocide Convention, together under
131. See supra notes 113-16, 121-23. All of these statements were made after the
Genocide Convention had been opened for signature in 1948.
132. See G.A. Res. 95(I) (Dec. 11, 1946).
133. G.A. Res. 177(111) (Nov. 21, 1947).
134. See Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 15, attached to G.A.
Res. 174(111) (Nov. 21, 1947) ("'Progressive development of international law' is
used for convenience as meaning the preparation of draft conventions on subjects
which have not yet been regulated by international law. ... '[C]odification of international law' is used for convenience as meaning the more precise formulation and
systematization of rules of international law in fields where there already has been
extensive state practice, precedent and doctrine.").
135. See Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
Report by J. Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur, dated April 26, 1950, available in 2
Y.B. IN'L L. COMM'N 253-278 (1950), at 255 T 2 (noting that the Rapporteur was
not codifying existing international law but rather engaging in a task of a more
"speculative nature"); id. at 257 9120 (noting that the ILC had discussed the issue
and concluded that the draft code of offences represented the progressive development of international law).
136. Id. at 260 TT 43-45.
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the heading of "Crime No. VIII.' 137 However, this was awkward
because
genocide is essentially a subset of crimes against humanity. 138 The Rapporteur was certainly aware of this problem and
noted that the "distinction between these two crimes is not easy
to draw. ' 139 However, he described two significant differences:

1) "genocide is different from crimes against humanity in that, to
prove it, no connexion with war need be shown"; and 2) "crimes
against humanity do not necessarily involve offences against or
persecutions of groups. 1 40 Nevertheless, he was still unhappy
with his formulation and suggested that crimes against humanity

be dropped so as to avoid overlap with genocide and because he
thought that governments might be reluctant to accept the inclu141
sion of crimes against humanity.
The ILC reviewed the Rapporteur's first report in June of
1950 and endeavored to draft a code of offences based on it.142
The ILC's initial draft separated genocide and crimes against hu-

manity into different crimes but essentially retained the Nuremberg Tribunal's definition of crimes against humanity, including
the connection to armed conflict. 143 The ILC was apparently not
satisfied with its work because it referred the draft code back to
the Rapporteur and asked him to reconsider his report in light of
144
it.
In his second report, the Rapporteur made some very mi-

nor changes to the definition of crimes against humanity, 145 but

the report focused on the reactions of governments to the ILC's
137. Id. at 263.
138. See supra Section II(F).
139. See Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
supra note 135, at 263 65.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 263 66.
142. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly
on its Second Session, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 364-385 (1950), at 380 $$
151, 157 (noting that the ILC discussed the Rapporteur's report and decided to create a Drafting Sub-Committee to produce a "provisional draft of a code").
143. See Text Prepared by the Drafting Committee, available in 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 257 (1950). The document is available in electronic form at http://
untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a-cn4 -r6.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
In the Sub-Committee's draft, crimes against humanity could only occur in connection with: 1) the planning, preparation or use of armed force in international relations; 2) activities organized or tolerated by one state that were intended to create
terror in the population of another state; and 3) forcible attempts to annex territory.
Id.
144. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly
on its Second Session, supra note 142, at 380 157.
145. The definition of crimes against humanity was still clearly based on Article
6(c) of the IMT Charter and retained a connection to armed conflict. See Second
Report on a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
supra note 121, at 59
9. Crimes against humanity could only be committed in
connection with: 1) the planning, preparation or use of force; 2) activities organized
or tolerated by one state that were intended to create terror in the population of
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formulation of the Nuremberg Principles 146 and on the thorny
47
question of how to define aggression.
The ILC considered the Rapporteur's second report during
its third session, in 1951. During the discussion of crimes against
humanity, the debate about whether a connection with armed
conflict was required surfaced again. 148 The Rapporteur's draft
qualified the definition of crimes against humanity by requiring
that they be committed "in execution of or in connexion with"
certain other offences defined in his draft code.1 49 Those other
offences were the analogous offences to crimes against peace and
war crimes, and included the planning, preparation or use of
force, and violations of the laws or customs of war.' 50 The
French representative proposed deleting the reference to a connection with other crimes so that crimes against humanity would
5' Various other reprenot be connected with armed conflicts.'
52
sentatives opposed the proposal.
However, the strongest opposition came from the Rapporteur. He noted that the French proposal was far more than a
simple drafting change and that it would create a brand new
crime under international law.' 53 Moreover, he warned that the
creation of a brand new crime was likely to jeopardize the success of the entire draft code. He asked the Commission to "bear
in mind the fact that in the General Assembly many delegations
might refuse to accept the draft Code as a whole for the sole
reason that it contained that new crime. ' 154 Ultimately, the
French representative's proposal was put to a vote and decisively
defeated. 155
another state; 3) forcible attempts to annex territory; and 4) violations of the laws or
customs of war. Id.
146. Id. at 45-57.
147. Id. at 60-69.
148. During the formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, the French delegation
had argued that crimes against humanity should not require a connection with
armed conflict. The French view had not been widely accepted. See supra notes
121-23.
149. See supra note 145.
150. Id.
151. See Summary Record of the 91st Meeting, dated May 29, 1951, available in 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 72, 74 1$ 23-25 (1951); Id. at 75
50. The document is
available in electronic form at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/acn4_sr9l.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2006). This position was consistent with France's
position during the formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, where it had also advocated the removal of the nexus with armed conflict. See supra note 121.
152. See Summary Record of the 91st Meeting, dated May 29, 1951, supra note
151, at 74 28 (describing the French proposal as "going too far"); Id. at 75 43
(opposing the French proposal); Id. at 75 47 (opposing the French proposal).
153. Id. at 74 30-32.
154. Id. at 74 32.
155. Id. at 76 67.
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The French representative immediately tabled a new proposal that crimes against humanity be tied instead to "any of the
crimes defined in this code."'1 56 The Rapporteur again opposed
the amendment on the grounds that, although most of the crimes
in the code related to armed conflicts, genocide was one of the
crimes in the draft code, genocide could occur during peacetime,157 and therefore the French proposal would create the possibility of crimes against humanity occurring without a
connection with armed conflict. 158 Despite the Rapporteur's opposition, the amendment was adopted. 159 Consequently, by
1951, the ILC's definition of crimes against humanity had
become:
Inhuman acts by the authorities of a State or by private
individuals against any civilian population, such as murder, or
extermination, or enslavement, or deportation, or persecutions
on political, racial, religious or cultural grounds, when such
acts are committed in execution
of or in connection with other
160
offences defined in this article.

The newly defined crimes against humanity was still not an independent crime. It could only be committed in conjunction with
other international crimes, but the ILC's formulation would have
allowed the application of crimes against humanity without a
connection to armed conflict.
The General Assembly postponed consideration of the
ILC's draft in 1951 and then again in 1952.161 In 1953, the Commission discussed the matter again and requested that the Rap162
porteur present an updated report to the ILC's 1954 session.
In his updated report, the Rapporteur concluded that the comments of member states were too contradictory to convince him
156. Id. at 76 T 68.
157. See Genocide Convention, art. I, reprinted in DOCUMENTS AND CASES,
supra note 15, at 83-85 ("The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law
158. See Summary Record of the 91st Meeting, dated May 29, 1951, supra note
151, at 77 919 69, 78.
159. Id. at 77 T 76.
160. Report of the International Law Commission on its Third Session, May 16 Jul. 27, 1951, availablein 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 123, 136 (1951) (emphasis added).
The document is available in electronic form at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a cn4 48 corrl-2.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
161. See International Law Commission, Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind (Part I) at notes 10-11 (describing the history of the
draft code). The document is available in electronic form at http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc/summaries/73.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2006). See also Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Fifth Session, Jun. 1 - Aug. 14,
1953, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 231 9 167-68 (1953).

162. Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Fifth
Session, supra note 161, at 231 T 169.
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to modify the text that had been adopted by the ILC in 1951.163
During the discussions of the Rapporteur's report before the
1954 session of the ILC, the proposal to drop the connection between crimes against humanity and other international crimes
was again debated. 164 The debate was essentially a reprise of the
earlier debates about the Nuremberg Principles 165 and the earlier
drafts of the Code. 166 Several representatives argued that crimes
against humanity existed outside of and was broader than the
Nuremberg Principles, 167 while the others responded that the
amendment would effectively propose the creation of a new and
overly-broad crime under international law. 16 8 In particular, the
Rapporteur warned that the proposed amendment would require
that "any violation of human rights that constituted an ordinary
crime [ ] be treated as an international offence."'1 69 The issue was
eventually put to a vote, and the proposed deletion of the conclose vote,
nection with other crimes was approved on a very
170
abstention.
one
and
opposed
five
favor,
in
six
with
At the very next meeting, the ILC Commissioners realized
that the Rapporteur had been right, and that the deletion of the
connection with other crimes had left them with a definition of
crimes against humanity 171 where just about any human rights
violation committed by a private individual for any political, racial, religious or cultural reason would constitute an international
crime. 172 The ILC decided to reconsider how to limit the definition so that it did not turn too many domestic crimes into international ones.173 The debate continued during the next two
sessions, with various solutions being proposed. Ultimately, the
163. See Troisieme Rapport de J. Spiropoulos, Rapporteur Special, dated Apr.
30, 1954, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 118 (1954). The Rapporteur did note
that Yugoslavia had suggested the removal of the connection between crimes against
humanity and the other crimes in the draft code. Id. On the other hand, the Netherlands had criticized the definition of crimes against humanity for exceeding the
scope of the IMT Charter. Id.
164. See Summary Record of the 267th Meeting, dated Jul. 13, 1954, available in
1 Y.B. IN'r'L L. COMM'N 129, 132 (1954).
165. See supra notes 113-16, 121-23.
166. See supra notes 148-155.
167. See Summary Record of the 267th Meeting, supra note 164, IT 41, 45, 47-48.
168. Id. I 42, 46, 52, 54.
169. Id. 54.
170. Id. 59.
171. After the deletion of the connection with other crimes, the ILC's definition
was now: "Inhuman acts by the authorities of a State or by private individuals
against any civilian population, such as murder, or extermination, or enslavement, or
deportation, or persecutions on political, racial, religious or cultural grounds."
172. See Summary Record of the 268th Meeting, dated Jul. 15, 1954, available in
1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, 134, 135 (1954) (acknowledging that the text, as amended,
was "unsatisfactory" and "meaningless").
173. Id. 1 11.
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ILC presented the following text to the General Assembly in its
1954 report:
Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, or persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds
by the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting
174 at
the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.
The Commission noted that it had "decided to enlarge the scope
of the paragraph so as to make the punishment of the acts...
independent of whether or not they are committed in connexion
with other offences defined in the draft Code."'1 75 Both sides of
the debate realized that this definition of crimes against human176
ity was considerably broader than existing international law.
This represented the last work that would be done on the
draft code for many years. 177 In 1954, the General Assembly decided to postpone consideration of the draft code because of difficulties arising out of the definition of aggression. 178 The draft
code was not raised again by the General Assembly until the late
1970s.1 79
H.

THE

1960S AND 1970s - ADOLF EICHMANN'S

TRIAL, THE

CONVENTIONS ON STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND

THE APARTHEID CONVENTION

1.

The Eichmann Trial

The most significant war crimes trial to occur during the
1960s was that of Adolf Eichmann. He had been an officer in the
German S.S. during World War II, where he was responsible for
the logistics of identifying and transporting people to concentra174. Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Sixth
Session, Jun. 3 - Jul. 28, 1954, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 140, 150 (1954).
175. Id. at 150.
176. Proponents called it "a great step forward in the progress of international
law." See Summary Record of the 269th Meeting, available in 1 Y.B. IrNTr'L L.
COMM'N 140-146 1 40 (1954). Opponents described it as "far too revolutionary in
the present state of international law." Id. 1 42.
177. See generally International Law Commission, Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 161, at notes 13-16 (describing the lull in work on the draft code between 1954 and the late 1970s).
178. See G.A. Res. 897(IX) (Dec. 4, 1954). The difficulty of finding an acceptable definition of aggression was exacerbated by the Cold War, which divided the
East and West. That confrontation was the cause of much deliberate delay in the
work of the United Nations, particularly efforts to develop international criminal
law. See Cassese, supra note 45, at 10 ("The overriding explanation for why the
substantial work of this period was unable to come to fruition can thus be found
within the political stagnation caused by the Cold War ....). Consideration of the
draft code was postponed again in 1957, 1968 and 1974. See G.A. Res. 1186(XII)
(Dec. 11, 1957); International Law Commission, Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 161, at nn.13-14.
179. See infra Section II(I)(1).
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tion camps. In 1960 he was kidnapped in Argentina by Israeli
agents and flown to Israel where he was put on trial for war
crimes, "crimes against the Jewish people," and crimes against
humanity.180
Under Israeli law, crimes against humanity were defined as
"murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation, or deportation
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, and persecution on national, racial, religious or political
grounds." 18 This definition, most notably, removed the connection with armed conflicts. This is not surprising, as Israel had
been the only country that had supported France's proposal for
the removal of the connection with armed conflicts from the Nu182
remberg Principles' definition of crimes against humanity.
"Nevertheless, it does not appear that the conviction of Eichmann for crimes against humanity was183based on any of his acts
prior to the outbreak of war in 1939.'
2.

The 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutes
of Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity

The late 1960s and the early 1970s saw the creation of two
treaties which dealt with crimes against humanity. The first was
the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. 184 The parties to the Convention agreed that statutes of limitation should
not apply to war crimes or crimes against humanity. What is interesting about the Convention is the definition of crimes against
humanity. The Convention defines crimes against humanity as
including four categories of crimes: 1) crimes against humanity
"as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military
180. A complete (and very voluminous) record of the trial proceedings is available at http://wwwl.us.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/ (last visited May 4, 2006). Of particular interest is the Judgment of the trial court (the
District Court of Jerusalem), see http://wwwl.us.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Judgment/, and the Judgment of the appeals court (the Supreme Court of Israel), see http://wwwl.us.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmannadolf/transcripts/Appeal/.
181. Richard Baxter, The Municipaland InternationalLaw Basis of Jurisdiction
Over War Crimes, in 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, JURISDICTION AND COOPERATION 65, 81 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973)
(quoting the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710-1950); RATNER
& ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 52.
182. See supra note 122.
183. Baxter, supra note 181, at 84. See also RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27,

at 52 (noting that whether crimes against humanity required a nexus with armed
conflict was irrelevant to Eichmann's conviction).
184. See G.A. Res. 2391(XXIII) (Nov. 26, 1968) (containing the text of the Convention as an annex).
HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 159 2006-2007

PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 24:125

Tribunal"; 2) "eviction by armed attack or occupation"; 3) "inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid"; and 4) genocide

"as defined in" the 1948 Genocide Convention. 185 This definition is potentially important because, by adopting the definition

of crimes against humanity in the Charter of the IMT, the Convention apparently adopts the IMT's requirement of a connection with armed conflict. The Convention also mentions two
kinds of crimes against humanity that do not require a connection with armed conflict - apartheid 86 and genocide 187 - but
the overall impression is that the Convention requires a connec-

tion with armed conflict except where specific crimes, like
apartheid and genocide, had developed that were explicitly not

connected with armed conflict.
The Convention on Statutes of Limitation is fundamentally a
political document. Many of the newly-created developing states
viewed the IMT Charter and the Genocide Convention as embodying the viewpoints of the developed states and wished to use

the Convention on Statutes of Limitation to expand the definition of crimes against humanity. 188 For example, the representative of Dahomey (now Benin) stated that the definition of crimes
against humanity in the Charter of the IMT "represented the
views of the allied Powers in 1945 . .. " and argued that "because
of their limited purpose, those definitions were no longer suitable
89
for present-day world needs.'
185. See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations, supra
note 184, art. I(b).
186. In 1966 the General Assembly had declared that "the policies of apartheid
practised by the Government of South Africa [were] a crime against humanity." See
G.A. Res. 2202(XXI), 1 (Dec. 16, 1966). There was no armed conflict going on in
South Africa at the time, and it was generally agreed that, to the extent that
apartheid represented a crime against humanity, it could occur in the absence of an
armed conflict. However, many Western states opposed the inclusion of apartheid
as a crime against humanity. See infra note 198.
187. The Genocide Convention specifically states that genocide does not require
a nexus with armed conflict. See supra notes 129-30.
188. See Robert H. Miller, The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitationsto War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 476, 485
(1971).
189. See U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm. 23rd Sess., 1567th mtg., 24, U.N. Doc. A/
C.3/SR.1567 (Oct. 10. 1968). Other countries expressed similar positions. For example, the representative of Tanzania noted that the Charter of the IMT "and the principles formulated in Europe in 1945 were of much less interest to the [African and
Asian] countries than was the present-day fact of apartheid." See U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Comm., 23rd Sess., 1568th mtg., 12, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1568 (Oct. 10, 1968). The
Kenyan representative said that "[i]t was not sufficient to refer to international law
in defining the crimes in question since that law, which had been formulated in the
past by the developed countries, did not take into account certain present-day realities which were of the highest importance for the young countries." See U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1566th mtg., 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1566 (Oct. 9,
1968).
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The language about "eviction by armed attack or occupation" was added at the request of Arab states that were looking
to criminalize the actions of Israel in the territories it had seized
during the 1967 conflict in the Middle East. 190 It was supported
by countries like Libya, 191 Syria1 92 and Yemen. 193 The language
about "inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid" was
added at the request of African states, including Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Kenya, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Burundi,
Ivory Coast, Congo Brazzaville, and Tanzania, 194 that wished to
criminalize the actions of South Africa and Portugal. 195 These
additions were supported by several Soviet Bloc countries, 96 and
1 97
a number of other developing countries.
The expansion of crimes against humanity was opposed by
many Western states and Latin American states on the grounds
that the changes were either too political, too vague to serve as
the basis for criminal prosecutions, or an inappropriate attempt
to modify the substantive elements of the crime in a treaty about
statutes of limitation.1 98 Less than half of the member states of
190. See Miller, supra note 188, at 490.
191. The Libyan representative to the debates argued that the definition of
crimes against humanity had to be broad enough to include both the IMT's definition and crimes deriving from a policy of aggression "such as those caused by Zionist
expansion in the Middle East." U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1573rd mtg.,
19, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.1573 (Oct. 15, 1968).
192. The Syrian representative "welcomed" the fact that the "systematic policy
of eviction of the Arab population practised by Israel since 1948... came within the
scope of the convention." U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1573rd mtg., T 20,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1573 (Oct. 15, 1968).
193. The Yemeni representative was "pleased" that the convention would apply
to the "new crimes committed by the neo-nazi regime in Israel." U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Comm., 23rd Sess., 1573rd mtg., 40, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1573 (Oct. 15, 1968).
194. U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1565th mtg., 1 31 (Guinea); U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.1565 (Oct. 9, 1968); id. 9137 (Mauritania); id. 41 (Mali); U.N. GAOR,
3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1566th mtg. 1 5 (Kenya), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1566 (Oct. 9,
1968); id. 918 (Upper Volta); U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1567th mtg., I1
23(Burundi), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1567 (Oct. 10, 1968); id. 25 (Dahomey); U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1568th mtg., 1 7 (Ivory Coast), U.N. Doc. No. A/
C.3/SR.1568 (Oct. 10, 1968); id., 1 8 (Congo Brazzaville); id. 13 (Tanzania);
195. See Miller, supra note 188, at 491.
196. Id. See also U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1565th mtg., 9 27
(Ukraine), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1565 (Oct. 9, 1968).; U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd
Sess., 1566th mtg., 9112 (Soviet Union), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1566 (Oct. 9, 1968).;
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1567th mtg., 2 (Yugoslavia), U.N. Doc. A/
C.3/SR.1567 (Oct. 10, 1968); id. 914 (Poland); id. 9122 (Czechoslovakia); id. 31
(Byelorussia).
197. U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1563rd mtg., 1 33 (United Arab Republic), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1563 (Oct. 8, 1968); U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd
Sess., 1565th mtg., 912 (Libya), U.N. No. A/C.3/SR.1565 (Oct. 9, 1968); id. 1 18
(India); id. 9 20 (Iraq); id. 9124 (Morocco); U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess.,
1566th mtg., 913 (Cyprus), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1566 (Oct. 9, 1968).
198. See Miller, supra note 188, at 491. Western states explicitly opposing the
additions included the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Norway,
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the United Nations voted in favor of the Convention, and no
Western state did so.199 Western countries refused to join the
Convention, and in 1975 it would have been quite clear that the

Convention was primarily the work of developing countries in
Africa, with the support of Soviet-aligned countries in Eastern
2 00

Europe.

However, at the Convention there was some debate about
the necessity of a nexus with armed conflict in the definition of
crimes against humanity from which it is possible to shed light on

many states' views. In early 1967, the UN Secretary-General's
office had prepared draft language for a convention on statutes

of limitation in response to a request from the Economic and

Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Portugal, Australia, and Canada. and
Japan. U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1564th mtg., 2 (United Kingdom),
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1564 (Oct. 8, 1968); U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess.,
1565th mtg., 10 (United States), UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1565 (Oct. 9, 1968) (arguing
that the draft convention was "not the appropriate vehicle" for the redefinition of
international crimes); id. 13 (France) (decrying the addition of "new and imprecise
elements" to the definitions of crimes against humanity); id. 22 (Norway) (arguing
that the additions were "extremely vague and imprecise" and stating that the convention should not undertake to "define new types of crimes against humanity"); id.
IT 32-33 (Belgium); id. 35 (Italy) (stating that Italy could not support the convention if it "attempted to redefine war crimes and crimes against humanity"); U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1568th mtg., 10 (New Zealand), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR.1568 (Oct. 10, 1968,) (supporting a definition of crimes against humanity that
was clear, precise and "based on established law"); id. 29 (the Netherlands) (stating that it was not "advisable ... to try to redefine all crimes against humanity");
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1573rd mtg., 10 (Portugal), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR.1573 (Oct. 15, 1968); id. 12 (Australia) (supporting the IMT's definitions of
crimes against humanity and arguing that it was "inappropriate in the present context to extend the categories of crime under existing international law"); id. 23
(Canada); id. 38 (Japan).
Latin American states opposing the additions included Chile, Peru, Venezuela,
Ecuador, and Uruguay. See U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1563rd mtg., T 36
(Chile), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1563 (Oct. 8, 1968); U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd
Sess., 1567th mtg.,
32 (Peru), UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1567 (Oct. 10, 1968); U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1568th mtg.,
4 (Venezuela), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR.1568 (Oct. 10, 1968); U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1573rd mtg., 1 31
(Ecuador), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1573) (Oct. 15, 1968); id. 35 (Uruguay).
199. See Miller, supra note 188, at 477-78, 500. Ultimately it passed because a
large number of countries abstained or refused to vote on it.
200. By December 31, 1975, it had nineteen members: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cuba, Guinea, Hungary, India, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Nigeria,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Rwanda, Tunisia, and Ukraine. By
January 1, 1980, it had only one more member: Gambia. The major Western countries, like the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, Italy and Spain, have never become parties to the Convention. See Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu3/b/treaty6.htm (last visited May 26, 2006) (describing the status of the
Convention and listing the parties).
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Social Council. 201 The proposed language limited crimes against
humanity to the definition contained in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, and thus required a nexus with armed
conflict. 20 2 The proposal was debated in the 1967 meeting of the
Commission on Human Rights, where the necessity of a nexus
was raised. According to the summary of the debate, "certain
representatives" believed the proposed definition was too narrow and that "the definition of crimes against humanity should
now be revised to make such crimes punishable per se, whether
or not they were prepared or carried out in connexion with any
war. ' 20 3 "Some other representatives" disagreed. 2°4 It appears
from the language used to describe the two factions that they
were supported by approximately the same number of states.
As a result of the disagreement over the language of the
draft convention, the Commission decided to appoint a working
group to refine the text. 20 5 However, the working group was not
able to reach a consensus on the language. "Some" members of
the group, including the United States, urged the adoption of a
definition that would have limited crimes against humanity to
something similar to genocide. 20 6 However, a much broader definition that would have eliminated the nexus with armed conflict,
received "considerable support. ' 20 7 The Commission on Human
201. See Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Twenty-Third Session,
Feb. 20 - Mar. 23, 1967, 1 136-37, in Economic and Social Council Official
Records, Forty-Second Session, Supp. No. 6.
202. Id. 144.
203. Id. 144.
204. Id. 145.
205. Id. 153.
206. Id. 155, art. II, T 2 ("For the purposes of the present convention, any of
the acts enumerated in paragraph A of this Article [murder, torture, or inhuman
treatment], when committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such shall be considered 'crimes against humanity', whether or not committed in time of war."). The inclusion of the specific intent
requirement of genocide would have severely limited the scope of crimes against
humanity.
207. Id. ("For the purposes of the present convention, 'crimes against humanity'
shall mean inhuman acts such as genocide, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, including inhuman acts resulting from the policy of
apartheid, committed in time of war or in peace time against the civilian population
or certain elements of that population on social, political, economic, racial, religious
or cultural grounds by the authorities of the State or by private individuals acting at
the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities."). This definition is obviously based on the ILC's 1954 draft Code, with the addition of references to genocide and apartheid. See supra note 174 (describing the ILC's 1954 draft Code).
See also Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Twenty-Third Session,
supra note 201, 177 (noting that "some representatives" criticized the broader definition as "vague and perhaps too extensive," while others thought that the ILC's
formulation, "although never formally approved by the General Assembly, should
be given due consideration.").
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Rights was unable to reconcile the two camps and simply forwarded both proposals to the General Assembly. 208 Nevertheless, given the language used to describe the strength of the
support for the various proposals, it appears that the definition
that eliminated the nexus requirement received more support in
the working group.
Upon receiving the competing proposals from the Commission on Human Rights, the General Assembly appointed a Joint
Working Group to complete the work of preparing a draft convention. 209 The Joint Working Group produced a draft convention that adopted the definition of crimes against humanity that
was based on the ILC's 1954 draft code:
Crimes against humanity, which for the purpose of the Convention shall mean inhuman acts such as genocide, murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, eviction by armed
attack or occupation, or persecutions, including inhuman acts
resulting from the policy of apartheid,committed in time of
war or in peace-time against the civilian population or certain
elements of that population on social, political, economic, racial, religious, or cultural grounds by the authorities of the
State or by private individuals acting
at the instigation or with
210
the toleration of such authorities.
As the Western states would later argue, 211 the Joint Working
Group's definition was vague, overtly political, imprecise, overbroad, and certainly an attempt to use the draft Convention to
redefine crimes against humanity. Yet it is important because it
indicates that there was significant support for the removal of the
nexus.
The draft convention prepared by the Joint Working Group
was then circulated to member states, who were invited to submit
comments. 212 The Secretary-General's office received and compiled those comments. While most of the comments focused on
whether or not apartheid belonged in the definition, Dahomey
(now Benin) noted with approval the removal of the nexus with
208. Id. 181. See also Question of Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons
Who Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, Report of the Secretary-General,
dated Aug. 21, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/71774,
2-3.
209. See Question of Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes Against Humanity, Report of the Secretary-General, supra note
208, 4. It is not unusual for issues to be referred to one of the General Assembly's
committees for preliminary work before they are discussed in a plenary session.
210. Id., Annex 1, art. 1(b).
211. See supra note 198.
212. See Question of Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes Against Humanity, Report of the Secretary-General, supra note
208, 1 4.
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armed conflict. 213 Another six states (Bulgaria, Central African
Republic, Poland, Togo, Ukraine, and the Soviet Union) endorsed the Joint Working Group's language, which implies support for the removal of the nexus with armed conflict, even
214
though they did not mention the nexus requirement explicitly.

However, it appears that an even larger number of states criticized the 15language for being too vague, imprecise or
2
expansive.
The Joint Working Group's draft language, as well as the
comments of member states, was then debated before the Third

Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) in October and
213. See id. at 15 (Dahomey) ("Moreover, it is essential that crimes against humanity should not be tied to a state of war and war crimes.").
214. See id. at 6 (Bulgaria) ("The text contained in paragraph 9 of the abovementioned report of the working group should continue to serve as an appropriate
basis for the convention itself."); id. at 8 (Central African Republic) ("The Government of the Central African Republic has approved the draft convention concerning
the punishment of war criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against
humanity."); id. at 36 (Poland) ("The preamble and article I of the draft convention
[the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity], which correspond to the
international requirements and which meet with the approval of the Polish Government, constitute a particular achievement."); id. at 41 (Togo) ("Article 1, paragraph
2 of the convention [the definition of crimes against humanity] thus has the merit of
defining this crime and giving examples of it."); id. at 43 (Ukraine) ("The provisions
of article I of the draft convention, which were drafted on the basis of discussion of
various proposals, represent in our view a fairly successful enumeration of those
crimes to which statutory limitation will not be applied."); id. at 45 (Soviet Union)
("This draft, which takes into consideration the positions of the majority of States
Members of the United Nations, is on the whole a positive document .... "). The
support of so many Soviet Bloc states is indicative of the political nature of the
definitions.
215. See id. at 9 (Chile) (advocating removal of apartheid); id. at 14 (Cuba) (arguing that the definition of crimes against humanity was too "loose, vague and obscure"); id. at 17 (Denmark) (criticizing the expansion of crimes against humanity);
id. at 20 (Italy) (criticizing the "extremely imprecise" definition of crimes against
humanity); id. at 22 (Japan) (describing the definition as "too general" to be useful);
id. at 23 (Laos) (criticizing the definition as "unacceptable"); id. at 26 (Norway)
("[I]t is the opinion of the Norwegian authorities that the provisions of the draft
convention, as now presented, are too broad in scope and somewhat lacking in precision."); id. at 47 (United States of America) (arguing that the definition of crimes
against humanity was "needlessly broad and lack[ed] juridical precision"); Question
of Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes
Against Humanity, Note by the Secretary General, dated Sept. 18, 1968, U.N. Doc.
A/7174/Add.1, at 3 (United Kingdom) (arguing that crimes against humanity should
be limited to the IMT's definition); Question of Punishment of War Criminals and of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, Note by the Secretary
General, dated Oct. 14, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/7174/Add.2, at 2 (Madagascar) (criticizing expansion of crimes against humanity beyond IMT's definition); Question of
Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes Against
Humanity, Note by the Secretary General, dated Oct. 17, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/7174/
Add.3, at 4 (Israel) (expressing concern that the language was too imprecise and
ambiguous).
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November of 1968.216 It was these debates that led to the final

language of the 1968 Convention on Statutes of Limitation.
While there was no explicit discussion about the necessity of a
nexus with armed conflict, a number of representatives indicated
that they supported the definition of crimes against humanity
drafted by the Joint Working Group. 217 As noted above, a num-

ber of Western states and Latin 218
American states opposed the
Joint Working Group's definition.
The Joint Working Group's language was never voted on by
the General Assembly. Four countries, the United States,
France, Mexico, and the Netherlands, proposed an amendment
to the Joint Working Group's language that would have limited
216. See Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who
Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, Report of the Third Committee, dated
Nov. 21, 1968, U.N. Doc. A/7342. $$ 5-7.
217. See U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1563rd mtg., $ 33 (United Arab
Republic), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1563 (Oct. 8, 1968) (noting that the United Arab
Republic had "striven for the inclusion of the principles set forth in article I"); U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1565th mtg., 2 (Libya), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1565
(Oct. 9, 1968) (noting that Libya "whole-heartedly supported the existing text of
Article I"); id. $ 12 (Syria) (noting that Article I "was the most important" and
represented an acceptable "balance" between the events of the past and the events
of the present); id. $ 25 (Malaysia) (noting that Malaysia "had no difficulty whatever
in agreeing to article I, as currently worded"); id. 31 (Guinea) (endorsing the Joint
Working Group's definition); id. 37 (Mauritania) (arguing that Article I was of
39 (Bulgaria) (endorsing the Joint Working
"fundamental importance"); id.
Group's definition); id. 41 (Mali) (finding the "text of article I acceptable as it
stood"); U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1566th mtg., $ 5 (Kenya), U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.1566 (Oct. 9, 1968) (noting that Kenya "supported article I sub-paragraph
(b) as drafted by the Joint Working Group); id. 1 8 (Upper Volta) (opposing efforts
by the United States, France, Mexico and the Netherlands to amend the Joint Working Group's definition of crimes against humanity); U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd
Sess., 1567th mtg., $ 2 (Yugoslavia), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1567 (Oct. 10, 1968) (endorsing Article I of the Joint Working Group's draft); id. 913 (Poland) (noting that
the Polish delegation found the Joint Working Group's definitions of crimes against
humanity "acceptable"); id. 9 11 (Israel) (noting that Israel would prefer the
broader definition offered by the Joint Working Group rather than the narrower
definition offered by the United States, France, Mexico and the Netherlands); id. 91
21 (Indonesia) (finding the Joint Working Group's definition to be "acceptable"); id.
9 22 (Czechoslovakia) (agreeing to "article I as it appeared in the draft prepared by
the Joint Working Group); id. 9124 (Dahomey) (stating that Article I of the draft
convention "was of the utmost importance to international law"); id. 91(Byelorussia)
(stressing the "importance of article I of the draft convention"); U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Comm., 23rd Sess., 1568th mtg., $ 7 (Ivory Coast), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1568 (Oct.
10, 1968) (supporting "the draft convention submitted by the Joint Working Group
as it stood"); id. 918 (Congo Brazzaville) (endorsing Article I of the draft convention); id. 9111 (Algeria) (arguing that Article I "should be retained" as it was now
worded); id. 9 14 (Tanzania) (noting that Tanzania had voted in favor of the Joint
Working Group's draft of Article I); id. 17 (Liberia) (finding "the text of the draft
satisfactory on the whole"); id. 9 26 (Hungary) (stating that "the text of article I
adopted by the Joint Working Group was entirely acceptable to his delegation").
218. See supra note 198.

HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 166 2006-2007

2007]

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

crimes against humanity to the IMT definition plus genocide. 2 19
This amendment was known as the "Four Powers" amendment.
Several other countries, including Upper Volta, then proposed an
amendment to the Four Powers Amendment that inserted references to apartheid and "eviction by armed attack or occupation. '220 The Upper Volta sub-amendment was voted on first
and approved. 221 The Four Powers amendment-as modified by
the Upper Volta amendment-was voted on next and also approved. 2 22 This resulted in the language for Article I that was
eventually incorporated into the 1968 Convention on Statutes of
Limitation.
Even though the Joint Working Group's language was not
adopted, there is evidence that many countries would have accepted the removal of the nexus with armed conflict from the
definition of crimes against humanity. A close reading of the negotiating history of the 1968 Convention on Statutes of Limitation reveals that there were two significant factions within the
General Assembly. One group, composed primarily of developing countries in Africa, with the support of Soviet Bloc countries,
would have accepted the removal of the nexus with armed conflict from the definition of crimes against humanity, although it
seemed to be more concerned with the inclusion of apartheid in
the definition. Another group, composed largely of Western European, North American and South American countries, opposed efforts to broaden the scope of crimes against humanity
and wished to retain the IMT's definition, including the nexus
with armed conflict. Perhaps more importantly, neither faction
represented a clear majority, although it appears there was
slightly more support for the group that wanted to broaden the
definition of crimes against humanity.
3.

The 1974 European Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and
War Crimes

The 1968 Convention on Statutes of Limitation was followed
in 1974 by the European Convention on the Non-Applicability of
219. See Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who
Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity, Report of the Third Committee, dated
Nov. 21, 1968, UN Doc. A/7342, 19.
220. Id. $ 20. The countries that supported amending the Four Powers amendment were India, Kuwait, Mali, Senegal, the United Arab Republic, and Upper
Volta. Id.
221. U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., 1568th mtg., 41, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR.1568 (Oct. 10, 1968) ("The second sub-amendment submitted by India, Kuwait,
Mali, Senegal, the United Arab Republic, and Upper Volta... was adopted by 59
votes to 13, with 26 abstentions.").
222. Id.
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Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and War

Crimes, 223 which limits crimes against humanity to genocide as

defined in the 1948 Genocide Convention. 224 It does not even
cover crimes against humanity as described in the Charter of the

IMT, let alone the broader definition proposed by the ILC in

1954. This may be the result of Western European opposition to
the way crimes against humanity was defined in the 1968 Convention on Statutes of Limitations and a more general opposition
by Western states to the enlargement of crimes against
225
humanity.
4.

The Apartheid Convention

In 1973, the General Assembly opened the Apartheid Convention for signature. 22 6 It declared that apartheid was a crime
against humanity 227 and provided for individual criminal responsibility.2 28 Significantly, apartheid is defined without reference to
the existence of armed conflict.2 2 9 Rather, it depends on the es-

tablishment and maintenance of domination by one racial group
over any other racial group. 230 The Convention was aimed par-

ticularly at the "practices of racial segregation and discrimination
as practised in southern Africa.

'2 31

Given the focus on the prac-

tices of South Africa, it is perhaps not surprising that many African countries signed the treaty quite quickly.232 It was also

223. See European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation
to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, dated Jan. 25, 1974, reprinted in DocUMENTS AND CASES, supra note 15, at 535-37.

224. Id., art. 1(1).
225. See generally supra Section II(H)(2).
226. G.A. Res. 3068(XXVIII) (Nov. 30, 1973) (containing the text of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid).
227. Apartheid Convention, supra note 226, art. I.
228. Id., art. III.
229. Id., art. II.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Information on signatures, accessions and ratifications of the Apartheid
Convention can be found at the website of the United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights. See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty8_
asp.htm (last visited May 26, 2006). By the time the Convention entered into force
on July 18, 1976, it had over thirty parties: Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ecuador, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Mongolia, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania,
Soviet Union, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates. By January 1, 1980, it had an additional twentyseven members: Barbados, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, India, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Peru, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Tunisia, and Tanzania.
The list of parties overlaps considerably with the parties to the 1968 Convention
on Statutes of Limitations. See supra note 200.
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signed by several Soviet allies in Eastern Europe and by some
countries in Central America, South America and the Middle
East. It had not been signed by any Western countries by the
time it entered into force on July 18, 1976. In fact, major Western powers, like the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
have never beGermany, Canada, Australia, Italy and Spain,
233

come parties to the Apartheid Convention.

THE 1980'S AND 1990's - THE ILC, THE
AD Hoc CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, AND THE

I.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

1.

The ILC Once Again Takes Up Work on a Draft Code of
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind

In December 1978, the General Assembly "recall[ed]" that
it had postponed consideration of the ILC's Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace And Security of Mankind repeatedly
since 1954 and invited member states to submit comments on the
draft. Furthermore, the General Assembly tentatively decided
that it would discuss the Draft Code and the member states' comments during the 35th session, in 1980.234 In 1980, the General
Assembly repeated its invitation, 235 and in 1982, after a hiatus of
nearly thirty years, the ILC once again took up the draft code of
offences.236
The process, unsurprisingly, was slow, 2 3 7 and it was not until
1984 that the ILC began its work by basically accepting the 1954
draft code's definition of crimes against humanity, including the
233. See supra note 232.
234. See G.A. Res. 33/97 (Dec. 16, 1978).
235. See G.A. Res. 35/49 (Dec. 4, 1980) (noting that "further comments and observations on the Draft Code ... are yet to be submitted by Member States").
1 (Dec. 10, 1981).
236. See G.A. Res. 36/106,
237. The first year, the ILC only appointed a Special Rapporteur and asked him
to prepare a report for the 1983 session. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Thirty-Fourth Session, May 3 - Jul. 23, 1982, available in 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (2) 1, 121 (1982) (describing the ILC's decisions regarding the
draft code of offences against the peace and security of mankind). The Rapporteur's
first report and the ILC session of 1983 merely cataloged the problems that the ILC
would have to address in updating the draft code of offences and discussed the
methodology of the project. Report of the International Law Commission on the
work of its Thirty-Fifth Session, May 3 - Jul. 22, 1983, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N (2) 13 (1983) (describing the problems the ILC would have to overcome in
completing work on the draft code of offences). The Rapporteur's 1984 report proposed beginning with the ILC's 1954 draft code. Special Rapporteur's Second Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
dated Feb. 1, 1984, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1) 89 (1984). The Special
Rapporteur suggested reconsidering the 1954 draft code and expanding "the list of
5.
offences proposed by it so as to reflect the international reality of today." Id.
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absence of a nexus with armed conflict. 238 The Rapporteur argued in favor of this definition of crimes against humanity,2 39 and
none of the commissioners disputed using it during discussion of

the Rapporteur's report.2 40 Two years later, in 1986, the Rapporteur proposed a slightly updated definition of crimes against

humanity, again without a nexus with armed conflict.2 41 He
noted that crimes against humanity had originally been "linked
to the state of belligerency,"2 42 but expressed his opinion that

''crimes against humanity can [now] be committed not only
within the context of an armed conflict, but also independently of
any such armed conflict. '243 He suggested that this change took
2 45
place in 1954,244 but was almost certainly wrong on this point.
In 1991, the ILC provisionally adopted a definition of crimes
238. The ILC concluded that the "1954 draft provided a good working basis, and
[decided] that the offences it contained should be retained." See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 36th Session, May 7 - Jul. 27, 1984,
available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (2) 9149 (1984). The discussion of crimes
against humanity in the ILC's report is quite brief, and there is no mention of any
controversy or debate surrounding the absence of a nexus with armed conflict. See
id. $1 37, 46.
239. See Special Rapporteur's Second Report, supra note 237, 11 (noting that
the "1954 draft itself departed from the Nurnberg context by defining crimes against
humanity regardless of any relation to war crimes."). Later in his report, the Special
Rapporteur suggests that the ILC's 1954 definition of crimes against humanity had
become law by 1984. See id. 9140 ("[I]t was only when sufficient time had elapsed
after the Nurnberg trials that the concept of a crime against humanity finally acquired its own autonomy and became detached from the state of war."). He does
not indicate when he thought this change had occurred.
240. The Commissioners discussed the Special Rapporteur's Report at the
1816th through 1823rd meetings (May 9th through May 21st). The minutes of the
meetings are available in 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 4 (1984). While most of the Commissioners who spoke mentioned crimes against humanity, none explicitly questioned or debated the absence of a nexus with armed conflict. The aspect of crimes
against humanity that seemed to most interest the Commissioners was how to draw
the line between simple violations of human rights that should be dealt with domestically and violations that are serious enough to give rise to international criminal
responsibility. There was also considerable debate about whether to add (and how
to define) apartheid as a specific form of crimes against humanity. The absence of a
nexus with armed conflict was not controversial.
241. See Special Rapporteur's Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offences
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, dated Mar. 11, 1986, available in 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N (1) 86 (1986) (defining crimes against humanity to include
"[i]nhuman acts which include, but are not limited to, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, or persecutions, committed against elements of a population
on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds").
242. Id. 6.
243. Id. 9111.
244. Id. 28 ("The 1954 draft code first rendered crimes against humanity autonomous by detaching them from the context of war.").
245. Even the Commissioners who were in favor of removing the nexus with
armed conflict from the 1954 definition of crimes against humanity recognized that
they were not describing the law as it stood in 1954 but were proposing a substantial
expansion of international law. See supra note 176. At the time, there was considerHeinOnline -- 24 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 170 2006-2007
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against humanity that did not include a nexus with armed conflict, 246

and while the text underwent further drafting changes
prior to the completion of the ILC's247
work in 1996, it remained
without a nexus with armed conflict.
The ILC defended its decision not to include a nexus with

armed conflict by arguing that the "autonomy of crimes against
humanity" had been recognized in legal instruments since the

Charter of the International Military Tribunal. In particular, the
ILC noted Control Council Law No. 10, the Statute of the Inter-

national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR). The commentary also notes the ICTY's suggestion in the Tadic case that it is a "settled rule of customary
international law" that crimes against humanity
do not need a
248
nexus with international armed conflict.
able doubt within the Commission about whether the member states would accept
the ILC's proposed expansion of the definition. See supra notes 151-55.
In his 1984 report, see supra note 237, the Special Rapporteur had not taken a
position on when the transition had supposedly taken place, other than to argue that
it was prior to 1984.
246. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 43rd
Session, Apr. 29 - Jul. 19 1991, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (2) 96 (1991).

The provisional title of the crime dropped the term "crimes against humanity," preferring instead the title "systematic or mass violations of human rights." See id., art.
21. The definition also included a requirement that torture, murder, slavery and
persecution be carried out "in a systematic manner or on a mass scale" before it
would qualify as a crime. Deportation or the forcible transfer of population would
not require this added element. Id. This drafting change was made to restrict the
crimes covered by the draft Code to those of an "extremely serious character." See
id. at 103, art. 21, Commentary 3. As a result, the provisional text adopted by the
Commission was considerably narrower than the definition proposed by the Special
Rapporteur.
In his 1989 report, the Rapporteur had proposed a definition that covered "all"
inhuman acts committed on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds, including "mass destruction" of property. See Special Rapporteur's Seventh Report
on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, dated Feb.
24,1989, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1) 81, 86 (1989). The Rapporteur had
suggested in his accompanying commentary that an individual act could constitute a
crime against humanity, if it were "part of a system, or us carried out according to a
plan, or has a repetitive nature .
I..."
Id. at 88 60. In its 1991 provisional draft, the
ILC limited the scope of acts that could be considered violations to torture, murder,
slavery, persecution and forcible deportation or transfer, and made the systematic or
widespread nature of the acts a required element of the crime.
247. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th
Session, May 6 - Jul. 26, 1996, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (2) 47 (1986).
The final definition specifically prohibited more acts, including institutionalized discrimination, arbitrary imprisonment, forced disappearances, rape, and other inhumane acts. Id. It retained the requirement that such acts be committed in a
systematic manner or on a large scale. Id. The changes were largely inspired by the
wording of Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda. See Bassiouni, supra note 8, at 568.
248. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th
Session, supra note 247, at 48 6. The reference to the ICTY's Statute is a little odd
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The Responses of Member States to the ILC's Work

The responses of U.N. member states to the General Assem-

bly's call for comments2 49 on the ILC's 1954 draft code of offences are more important than the deliberations of the ILC
itself because the ILC cannot create new international law, while
the views of member states could be evidence of the opinio juris
necessary to create new customary international law.2 5 0 One of

the most striking things about the comments is how the influence

of the Cold War permeates them.2 51 The comments received in
1982,252 1983,253 1985254 and 1987255 largely represent the view-

points of Soviet allies. A number of developing states also responded, but it is clear that the Eastern Bloc states were acting in
a coordinated manner. 256 None of the major Western states

commented.
because Article 5 actually includes a requirement of a nexus with armed conflict.
See infra note 265. Of course, in the Tadic case, the ICTY suggested that this limitation in its own statute was potentially unnecessary. The Tadic case is discussed in
more detail below. See infra notes 277-81.
249. See supra notes 234-35.
250. See infra notes 303-07 (describing the elements of customary international
law).
251. Cf. Cassese, supra note 45, at 9-10 (noting the impact of the Cold War on
the development of international criminal law).
252. See Comments and observations received from Governments pursuant to
General Assembly Resolution 36/106, dated May 1982, in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
(1) 273 (1982).
253. See Comments and observations received from Governments pursuant to
General Assembly Resolution 37/102, dated May 1983, in 2 Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N
(1) 153 (1983).
254. See Observations of Member States and intergovernmental organizations
received pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 39/80, dated May 1985, in 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N (1) 84 (1985).
255. See Observations of Member States received pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 41/75, dated May 1987, in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1) 11 (1987).
256. Between 1982 and 1987 comments were received from Barbados, Belarus,
Brazil, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Egypt, Finland, Gabon, Mongolia, Qatar,
the Soviet Union, Suriname, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The developing
states are numerically superior to the Eastern Bloc states, but the Eastern Bloc
states had clearly coordinated their responses. For example, Belarus stated that a
draft code of offences was important at a time "when imperialist circles are counting
on exacerbating tension in the world and on preparation for war and would like to
discard the legal and ethical rules..." that govern international relations. See 1982
Comments, supra note 252, at 275. Other Eastern Bloc states echoed this theme.
Czechoslovakia accused the West of encouraging "an intensified arms race" and
"notions of a limited nuclear war." Id. at 275. East Germany worried about the
"aggravated international situation and the resultant risk of a new world war .... "
Id. at 276. Ukraine claimed that there had been a deterioration of the international
situation caused by "the irresponsible action of imperialist circles ... that have embarked on a course of confrontation, escalation of the arms race, and revival of the
'cold war."' Id. at 277. The Soviet Union used similar language. Id. at 279. In 1985,
Mongolia also blamed the "increased risk of nuclear war" on the "aggressive forces
of imperialism." 1985 Comments, supra note 254, at 86.
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None of the states' comments directly addressed whether
they believe a nexus with armed conflict is necessary. Crimes

against humanity were mentioned in passing several times,25 7 but
the main focus of the comments was on the expansion of the sub-

ject matter jurisdiction of the draft code to include various crimes
which states thought should be added. Nevertheless, the Eastern
Bloc states seemed to generally agree that the ILC's 1954 draft
code of8 offences constituted an acceptable basis for further
25
work.
3.

The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia

In the midst of the ILC's work on the draft Code, the Cold
War ended, the former Soviet Union collapsed, and ethnic conflicts that had been suppressed under communist rule erupted in
parts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.25 9 The
end of the Cold War heralded a period of rapid change in international criminal law, particularly the creation of new mechanisms for accountability.
The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia first came to the
attention of the Security Council in 1991, when the Council expressed concern for "the fighting in Yugoslavia, which is causing
a heavy loss of human life ....",260 Yugoslavia was on the Security Council's agenda again repeatedly in 1991 and 1992.261 In re257. For example, a number of Eastern Bloc states refer to the first use of nuclear weapons as "the gravest crime against humanity." See 1982 Comments, supra
note 252, at 275. (Belarus and Czechoslovakia); id. at 279 (Soviet Union). East Germany and Uruguay both refer affirmatively to the definition of crimes against humanity used by the IMT, but it does not appear that they were explicitly taking the
position that a nexus with armed conflict was still required. See id. at 276 (East
Germany notes that the work of the ILC should be predicated on the Charter of the
IMT); id. at 280 (Uruguay notes that the "the crimes against humanity defined in the
Charter" of the IMT represent international crimes).
258. Belarus called it an "acceptable basis for further work." See 1982 Comments, supra note 252, at 274. Czechoslovakia called it a "suitable basis." Id. at 275.
See also id. at 277 (Ukraine); id. at 279 (Soviet Union); 1983 Comments, supra note
253, at 154 (Suriname); 1985 Comments, supra note 254, at 86 (Mongolia).
259. See Stuart Ford, OSCE National Minority Rights in the United States: The
Limits of Conflict Prevention, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1999) (discussing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of conflicts in Yugoslavia,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Trans-Dniester and Ossetia in the early 1990s). See also Cassese, supra note 45, at 11 (noting that the end of the Cold War caused a "fragmentation of the international community" and resulted in the "implosion of previously
multi-ethnic societies" ultimately leading to "gross violations of international humanitarian law on a scale comparable to those committed during World War II").
260. S.C. Res. 713 (Sept. 25, 1991). U.N. Security Council Resolutions are available online at http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm.
261. In 1991, the Security Council addressed the former Yugoslavia three times,
in resolutions 713, 721 and 724. In 1992, the Security Council addressed the former
Yugoslavia more than twenty times, in resolutions 727, 740, 743, 749, 752-58, 760-62,
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sponse to evidence that atrocities were taking place in the former
Yugoslavia, the Security Council created a Commission of Experts in late 1992 to "examine and analyze" the evidence of grave

breaches of the Geneva Conventions and "other violations of international humanitarian law."'2 62 In February 1993, the Security
Council accepted the Commission of Experts' recommendation
and decided to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).2 63 In May, the Security Council
adopted the Statute of the ICTY, which had been drafted by experts working under the direction of the Secretary General. 264

The definition of crimes against humanity in the Statute of
the ICTY is intriguing. Under Article 5, the ICTY would have

the power "to prosecute persons responsible for [crimes against
humanity] when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character .... ",265 In effect, the ICTY's definition of crimes against humanity requires a nexus with armed
conflict. This seems a little odd, given that the drafters would

have considered the work of the ILC on the draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind.2 66 However,

the Secretary-General's Report on the statute suggests why a
nexus with armed conflict was included.
First, there was the problem of the Security Council's power
to create a tribunal. The Secretary-General's Report noted that
an international tribunal would normally be established by
treaty 267 but concluded that the Security Council would have the

authority to create the ICTY by virtue of its power under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to maintain international
peace and security.26 8 However, the drafters of the Report were

764, 769-71, 776-77, 780-81, 786-87, and 798. In many ways, the Security Council's
responses to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia were ineffective. The creation of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia was motivated in part by guilt
over the international community's inability to craft effective political and military
responses to the conflict and by a desire to be seen to be doing something concrete
to end the bloodshed. See Cassese, supra note 45, at 12.
262. See S.C. Res. 780, 2 (Oct. 6, 1992). The idea of creating a tribunal to try
those responsible for the atrocities in Yugoslavia was first raised by lawyers and
politicians in early 1992. See Cassese, supra note 45, at 12 n.28.
263. See S.C. Res. 808, 1 (Feb. 22, 1993).
264. See S.C. Res. 827, 2 (May 25, 1993) (deciding to adopt the Statute proposed by the Secretary General in his report pursuant to Security Resolution 808).
The Secretary General's Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S.C. Res. 808 (May 3,
1993), UN document number S/25704, is available from the website of the ICTY at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm (last visited May 11, 2006).
265. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 264, art. 5.
266. Id. [ 17 (noting that the Secretary-General had "consulted" texts prepared
by the International Law Commission). The ILC texts consulted surely must have
included the draft Code of Offences.
267. Id. 9119.
268. Id. T 22.
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aware that the Security Council is a political, not a legislative
body, and it did not have the power to create new international
crimes to be used at the ICTY. While the Security Council could
create the ICTY, it would be limited to applying existing interna269
tional law.
The second problem was the principle of legality.2 7 0 The
drafters of the Report were concerned that the principle of legality would prevent the prosecution of individuals for violations of
international criminal law unless it was indisputable that the
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTY represented established customary law.2 71 Consequently, the ICTY would use only
that part of international criminal law that had
become "beyond
2 72
doubt" part of customary international law.
The Secretary-General's Report concluded that the four
sources of international criminal law that were beyond doubt
were: 1) the Geneva Conventions of 1949; 2) the Hague Convention of 1907; 3) the Genocide Convention; and 4) the "Charter of
the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945."273 The
drafters apparently doubted that those definitions of crimes
against humanity that eliminated the nexus with armed conflict
had become customary international law. There is a reference to
Control Council Law No. 10 (which did not require a nexus with
armed conflict) 274 in a paragraph on the origins of crimes against
humanity,2 7 5 but it was not listed
as being "beyond doubt" part
2 76
of customary international law.
The decision to restrict the ICTY's subject matter jurisdiction to crimes that were indisputably customary international law
was vindicated by the early attacks on the jurisdiction of the
court. The very first defendant, Dusko Tadic, challenged virtually every aspect of the ICTY's existence, including its subject
matter jurisdiction. That challenge resulted in an interlocutory
opinion by the Appeals Chamber on the jurisdiction of the
ICTY. 277 Mr. Tadic's lawyers argued that the customary interna269. Id. 29.
270. The principle of legality is discussed in detail in Section V.
271. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 264, 34 ("In the view of the
Secretary-General, the application of the principle of nullem crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond doubt part of customary law so that the problem of the
adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does not arise.").
272. Id. 35.
273. Id. 35.
274. See supra note 92.
275. See Secretary-General's Report, supra note 264, 47.
276. Indeed, there is some doubt about whether Control Council Law No. 10 was
meant to state a crime under international law at all. See supra notes 93-96.
277. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, dated Oct. 2, 1995. Copies of the ICTY's decisions
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tional definition of crimes against humanity was that used by the
IMT, and that the ICTY had improperly expanded the definition
by changing the nexus with "war" to a nexus with "armed conflict, whether international or internal." This was alleged to be a
278
violation of the principle of legality.
The ICTY responded by concluding that the Charter of the
IMT and the Nuremberg Principles had unnecessarily included a
nexus with armed conflict, and that there was "no logical or legal
basis for this requirement. ' 279 The court noted that Control
Council Law No. 10 had not required a nexus with armed conflict
and then went on to point out that the treaties that had codified
the crimes of genocide and apartheid had similarly omitted any
nexus with armed conflict. 280 Ultimately, the ICTY concluded
that the customary law of crimes against humanity does not require a nexus with international armed conflict and suggested
that it "may not require a connection between crimes against hu'
manity and any conflict at all. "281
are available from the ICTY website at http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm
(last visited May 12, 2006).
278. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 277, 139. Mr. Tadic's lawyers were
essentially arguing that the term "war" as it was used before and during WWII
equated to the modern term "international armed conflict" and that the inclusion of
"internal armed conflicts" expanded the definition of crimes against humanity to
cover crimes that would not have fallen under the jurisdiction of the IMT.
279. Id. 1 140. The ICTY seems to be wrong on this point. The discussions
amongst the ILC commissioners, as well as the comments of the member states,
indicate that, at least in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the nexus with armed conflict
was seen as a legal requirement of crimes against humanity. It was believed that it
was the nexus with armed conflict that made what would otherwise be domestic
crimes into international crimes. See supra notes 112-16, 121-23.
280. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 277, 140. There are potential problems
with the ICTY's arguments. For example, there is some doubt about whether Control Council Law No. 10 was intended to describe international crimes. See supra
notes 93-96. Moreover, it was clear in the early 1950s that the IMT Charter and the
Nuremberg Principles stated the accepted definition of crimes against humanity, not
Control Council Law No. 10. See supra note 124. In addition, the lack of a nexus
with armed conflict in the genocide convention and the apartheid convention is not
necessarily inconsistent with the requirement of a nexus with armed conflict in the
customary definition of crimes against humanity. See supra note 131.
281. Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 277, 141. The court went on to suggest
that the Security Council may have defined crimes against humanity "more narrowly
than necessary under customary international law." Id. In fact, it seems likely that
the drafters kept the nexus with armed conflict out of a desire to limit the jurisdiction of the ICTY to crimes that were "beyond doubt" part of customary international law. See supra notes 271-76. In 2002, the Appeals Chamber re-visited the
issue and concluded that the nexus with armed conflict was "purely jurisdictional,"
but nonetheless required evidence that there was an armed conflict and that the
"acts of the accused are linked geographically as well as temporally with the armed
conflict." Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., 83 (Case Nos. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A),
Judgment dated Jun. 12, 2002.
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The InternationalCriminal Court

At about this same time, the issue of whether crimes against
humanity required a nexus with armed conflict was being faced
by the drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC). In 1994, the General Assembly had created an Ad
Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court to take over the work of the ILC. 282 The ILC, recognizing the difficulties of defining a crime that was primarily the
product of customary international law, had not offered a definition of crimes against humanity in its draft statute, noting instead
that there were "unresolved issues about the definition of the
crime. ' '283 In the commentaries that accompanied the draft, the
ILC reprinted Article 5 of the ICTY (which does require a nexus
with armed conflict) and the analogous text from its own draft
Code of Offences (which does not require a nexus) but did not
284
take a position on which one was authoritative.
The Ad Hoc Committee was similarly unable to make up its
mind. It noted that there were "different views" amongst its
members about whether crimes against humanity required a
nexus with armed conflict, and decided to give the question "further consideration. '28 5 This debate continued during the Rome
Conference with "a significant number of delegations" taking the
position that a nexus with armed conflict was required,2 8 6 although ultimately the Rome Statute did not require a nexus with
armed conflict. 287

282. See G.A. Res. 49/53 (Dec. 9, 1994) (thanking the ILC for its draft statute
and deciding to convene an Ad Hoc Committee comprised of member states of the
UN to further study the matter).
283. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 46th
Session, May 2 - Jul. 22, 1994, available in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (2) 38, 40 (1994).

284. Id. at 40.
285. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, $ 79, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995). See also Otto Triffterer ed.,
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers'
Notes, Article by Article (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999) at 123 (noting that it was
"unresolved whether [crimes against humanity] needed to take place during armed
conflict...").
286. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 43 (2d ed. 2004) (citing Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson,
Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

79,
92 (Roy Lee ed., 1999)).
287. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7. The Rome
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS

Statute is available from the website of the ICC at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/

about/officialjournal/RomeStatute_120704-EN.pdf (last visited May 12, 2006).

HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 177 2006-2007

PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL

5.

[Vol. 24:125

The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda

In July 1994, the Security Council established a Commission
of Experts to "examine and analyse.., evidence of grave viola-

tions of international humanitarian law" committed in
Rwanda. 88 In its interim report of October 1994, the Commission of Experts recommended that the Security Council take "all
necessary and effective action" to ensure that those responsible
for the atrocities in Rwanda were "brought to justice before an
'289

independent and impartial international criminal tribunal.

The Security Council followed the Commission's recommendation and established the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in November of 1994.290
The Commission of Experts recommended that the ICTR

have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, but noted that
the formulation of crimes against humanity in the Charter of the
IMT had led to a "certain level of ambiguity in the content and
legal status" of crimes against humanity.2 91 The Commission had

already concluded that the conflict in Rwanda was a non-interna-

tional armed conflict,2 92 so it could not directly apply the Nurem-

berg definition, which required a nexus with an armed conflict.2 93
So, the Commission argued that crimes against humanity did not
require a nexus with armed conflict.2 94 The first argument put
forward by the Commissioners is that crimes against humanity is
288. See S.C. Res. 935, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (Jul. 1, 1994).
289. See Letter dated 1 October 1994 from the Sec'y Gen. addressed to the President of the SCOR (Oct. 4, 1994),
150, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (transmitting the
interim report of the Commission of Experts to the Security Council) [hereafter
Interim Report of Commission of Experts on ICTR].
290. See S.C. Res. 955, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). The Statute of
the ICTR was attached as an annex to this Resolution. In fact, the Security Council
only partially followed the Commission's recommendations. The Commission had
originally recommended that the Security Council amend the Statute of the ICTY to
give it jurisdiction over Rwanda. See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts
on ICTR, supra note 289, 152. The Commission believed that the creation of a
new tribunal would be less efficient and lead to "less consistency" in the application
of international criminal law. Id. 140. The Security Council declined this aspect of
the Commission's advice. It appears that a separate tribunal was created, at least in
part, because of Rwandan opposition to simply expanding the ICTY. See U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (where the
representative from New Zealand noted that many changes to the structure of the
ICTR, including whether it would be part of the ICTY,were made in response to
the concerns of Rwanda).
291. See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts on ICTR, supra note 289,
109.
292. Id. T 89-91 ("The armed conflict between the period 6 April and 15 July
1994 qualifies as a non-international armed conflict.").
293. Id. 113 ("If the normative content of 'crimes against humanity' had remained frozen in its Nuremberg form, then it could not possibly apply to the situation in Rwanda ....").
294. Id. IT 113-18.
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based on the "'principles of humanity' first invoked in the early
1800s by a State to denounce another State's human rights violations" and therefore applied to individuals "regardless" of
whether the criminal act was "perpetrated during a state of
armed conflict. ' 295 The Commission next noted that the Genocide Convention and the Apartheid Convention do not require a
nexus with armed conflict.2 96 Finally, the Commissioners noted
that the Commission of Experts for the ICTY had proposed a
definition of crimes against humanity that did not require a nexus
with armed conflicts.2 97 No mention was made of the various
formulations offered by the International Law Commission. Ultimately, the Security Council adopted a definition of crimes
against humanity for the ICTR that was different from the one
proposed by the Commission of Experts, but also did not require
a nexus with armed conflict. 298 Unfortunately, it is difficult to
determine precisely how the Security Council arrived at the definition it included in the Statute of the ICTR because there ap299
pear to be no records of the drafting process.
295. Id. 115. This argument is probably wrong. First of all, while States may
have used the phrase "principles of humanity" to condemn one another's human
rights violations in the 1800s, modern crimes against humanity clearly have their
origins in the Martens clause that accompanied conventions that regulated armed
conflicts, and crimes against humanity were initially conceived of as a part of the
laws and customs of war. See supra Sections II(A)-II(C). Moreover, in the years
immediately after the Nuremberg trials, leading scholars and the United Nations'
member states believed that the requirement of a nexus with armed conflict was a
substantive element of the crime. See supra notes 112-16, 121-23. There appeared
to be a widespread belief that a nexus with armed conflict was what made crimes
against humanity an international crime, rather than just a domestic crime. See
supra note 124. There were those who felt the nexus with armed conflict was legally
unnecessary, but they were distinctly in the minority. See supra notes 121-22.
296. See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts on the ICTR, supra note
289, 116.
297. Id. 117. The Commission fails to note that the Statute of the ICTY ultimately required a nexus with armed conflict, apparently because the drafters of the
ICTY statute were not certain whether the customary definition of the crime required one or not. See supra notes 271-76.
298. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8,1994). The ICTR Statute is
attached as an annex to the Resolution. Article 3 of the Statute defines crimes
against humanity as any of a number of specific acts that are "committed as part of a
widespread and systematic attack against any civilian population." In contrast, the
Commission had proposed a definition that required specific acts "committed by
persons demonstrably linked to a party to the conflict, as part of an official policy
based on discrimination against an identifiable group of persons." See Interim Report of the Commission of Experts on the ICTR, supra note 289, 118. Neither
required a nexus with armed conflict
299. The ICTY Statute had been proposed by the Secretary-General and
adopted by the Security Council. See supra note 264. Along with the proposal, the
Secretary-General prepared a report which provided legal explanations for the decisions contained in the proposal. By contrast, for the ICTR, the Security Council
drafted the Statute itself. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955, T 9, U.N. Doc. S/
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THE STATUS OF CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN 1975

A potentially crucial question for the Extraordinary Cham-

bers is whether the customary definition of crimes against humanity required a nexus with armed conflict in the period 1975 to

1979. As many writers have warned 300-including

the Group of

Experts that initially advised the United Nations on establishing

the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia-if crimes against humanity required a nexus with armed conflict in 1975, then many
of the atrocities committed in Cambodia may not qualify as
crimes against humanity. 30 1 There is some doubt about whether

a nexus with armed conflict was required because, unlike geno1995/134 (Feb. 13, 1995) ("The statute of the Rwanda Tribunal, which was an adaptation of the statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal, was drafted by the original sponsors of
Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) and discussed among members of the Council."). Unfortunately, there is little evidence of the drafting process in the official
records of the Security Council. Between October 4, when the Commissioners interim report was forwarded to the Security Council, and November 8, when Resolution 955 was passed, the ICTR only appears twice in the official meeting records.
Neither contains any substantive discussion of crimes against humanity, although the
records of the Security Council meeting on November 8 indicate that the process of
drafting the ICTR Statute had been "long and arduous." See U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., 3453rd mtg., at 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (where the representative from Pakistan noted that the negotiations on "finalization of the draft resolution
and the Statute of the Tribunal were long and arduous"); id. at 12 (where the representative from Spain noted that the ICTR Statute was the product of "intensive
consultations and negotiations").
The Secretary-General subsequently seemed to question the Security Council's
approach. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 955, 12, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (Feb.
13, 1995) (noting that the Security Council had "elected to take a more expansive
approach to the choice of applicable law than the one underlying the statute of the
Yugoslav Tribunal, and included within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
Rwanda Tribunal international instruments regardless of whether they are considered part of customary international law"); see also U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd
mtg., at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8, 1994) (where the Brazilian representative
argued that the ICTR Statute should have been "the object of comprehensive, indepth legal deliberations specifically focused on the circumstances of Rwanda" and
should have been "reviewed by a panel of jurists"). The Secretary-General's comment is apparently a reference to his earlier position that the ICTY should have
jurisdiction only over crimes that were "beyond doubt" part of customary international law. See supra note 272.
300. See supra note 5.
301. See Identical Letters dated March 15, 1999 from the Secretary-General to
the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. A/53/850 and S/1999/231 (containing the report of the Group of Experts
appointed to "evaluate the existing evidence with a view to determining the nature
of the crimes committed by Khmer Rouge leaders in the years 1975-1979"). The
Group of Experts concluded that if crimes against humanity did require a nexus with
armed conflict in 1975, then "the vast majority of the Khmer Rouge's atrocities
would not be crimes against humanity; historians have not linked the bulk of the
atrocities of the Khmer Rouge to the armed conflicts in which it engaged.... " Id.
71.
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cide and war crimes, in 1975 there was no widely-accepted convention that defined crimes against humanity. Therefore,
exploring the state of customary international law in 1975 is important to understanding whether there are any limitations on
how the Extraordinary Chambers can prosecute individuals for

crimes against humanity.
A.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Customary international law is one of the primary sources of

international law. 30 2 For a new custom to form there must be

evidence of two things: 1) a general practice amongst states; and
2) a belief amongst states that the practice is legally required
303
(sometimes called opinio juris).
The practice of states does not need to be perfectly uniform to
qualify as a general practice. 30 4 A certain amount of countervailing practice is to be expected, particularly for newly-formed
customs. Therefore, it can be hard to tell when a practice has
shifted from a situation where some states support it but other
states are opposed, to a situation where support for the practice
has become general.30 5 The question is even more difficult when
This paper takes no position on whether an armed conflict existed in Cambodia
at any given point between 1975 and 1979, but merely notes that others who have
studied the question have suggested that there were important periods during which
there was no armed conflict.
302. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38. There are three
primary sources of international law: 1) international conventions; 2) international
custom; and 3) "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Id.
"[Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists" are
described as a "subsidiary means" of determining the rules of international law. Id.
303. See id. (describing custom as "a general practice accepted as law"). See also
Ford, supra note 259, at 30-38 (discussing the evidentiary requirements of customary
international law); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 18.
304. See Ford, supra note 259, at 32-33 (noting that the International Court of
Justice has not been consistent in determining how uniform a practice must be
before it can be called general). At times the ICJ has found a practice to be general
despite a history of recurrent violations of the norm. In other cases, it has required
that practice be "extensive and virtually uniform." Id. It appears that the amount of
uniformity may be related to the length of time over which the practice has occurred. Thus practice may need to be more uniform when the proposed custom is
argued to have formed quickly. Id. at 33-34. See also RATNER & ABRAMS, supra
note 27, at 18 (noting that "great debate surrounds the degree of consistency required to show state practice").
305. While it is hard to describe the concept of a general practice without using
words like "majority" and "minority," the requirement of a general practice is not
simply a euphemism for "more than 50% of states." The ICJ has suggested that a
practice may sometimes need to be "virtually uniform" before it can be considered a
general practice. Ultimately, the level of uniformity required appears to vary with
the unique facts of each case. However, the length of time over which the customary
international law of crimes against humanity has developed-more than fifty
years-suggests that a lower standard of uniformity may be required. See supra
note 304.
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the best evidence of state practice only rarely occurs. 306 In such
cases, the practice of states must be inferred from less reliable
sources. 307 Opinio juris can also pose a problem because states
rarely provide public legal justifications for their actions. A

state's legal intent must often be inferred from the circumstances
surrounding its acts.
B.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

As described above, crimes against humanity has a history
which predates World War II. However, it did not exist as a specifically articulated crime with concrete elements before World

War II, and it was not until 1951 that the definition of crimes
against humanity in the Nuremberg Principles, including a nexus

with armed conflict, was widely accepted as customary international law. Objections to the removal of the nexus with armed

conflict continued until the 1998 negotiations of the Rome
Statute.

308

Therefore, 1951 to 1998 is the continuum on which the tran-

30 9
sition to a definition that does not require a nexus occurred.

However, unlike customs that form around international conventions, there is no clear date that represents the point when the
practice became general. Instead, over time more and more

states came to accept that a nexus was not required until a critical
point was reached where the absence of a nexus represented a
general practice amongst states, even though there was still opposition to the change. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to tell
exactly when the tipping point occurred.
306. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 20 (noting that the "unwillingness
of governments" to prosecute individuals for violations of international criminal law
between the end of WWII and the early 1990s means that there is little actual state
practice, and that scholars must rely "upon the statements of governments as evidence of their belief about the meaning of the law").
307. The definition of crimes against humanity used during actual prosecutions
or in treaties (or other legally binding commitments) prohibiting, punishing, or requiring prosecution of crimes against humanity would be the best evidence of how
states believe the crime should be defined.
General statements about how crimes against humanity should be defined, particularly when made in a political context, may be accorded less weight because of
the risk that they simply represent an attempt to gain some temporary advantage.
For instance, many of the statements made by Soviet Bloc states during the Cold
War seemed to have been primarily attempts to gain some advantage over the West.
See, e.g., supra Section II(H)(2) (describing the drafting of the 1968 Convention on
Statutes of Limitation). It is not at all clear that the Soviet Bloc states felt legally
bound to comply with the statements they were making.
308. See supra notes 283-87.
309. The large amount of time between the two endpoints of the process, as well
as the paucity of state practice during this period, is probably the result of the stagnation of international criminal law during the Cold War. See supra note 178.
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The discussion in Part II helps narrow the time during which

the tipping point was reached. If 1951 and 1998 are respectively
the date when it was certain that a nexus was required and the
date when it was certain that a nexus was not required, then 1968
(the year of the first Convention on Statutes of Limitations) appears to represent a point when those who would have removed
the nexus were almost equally balanced against those who opposed the removal, and 1984 (the year the ILC again recommended to the UN that it adopt a definition of crimes against
humanity that did not require a nexus with armed conflict) appears to represent a point when those who would remove the
nexus probably represented the mainstream of opinion within
the international community. Consequently, it seems likely that

the tipping point occurred at some point between 1968 and
1984.310 However, there is very little state practice during this
period, which makes it difficult to know whether the tipping
3 11
point occurred at the beginning, middle or end of that period.
310. This conclusion depends on what level uniformity is required before a general practice is acknowledged. If a court were to apply the ICJ's "extensive and
virtually uniform" standard, then a general practice might not have existed until
1998. However, the author believes that a looser standard is probably more appropriate. See supra note 304.
311. As noted below, looking at the inclusion of definitions of crimes against
humanity in the domestic laws of states in 1975 could provide evidence of whether
states believed a nexus was required. See infra Section III(C). Another way to approach the problem might be to look at the contemporaneous writings of scholars.
If there was a general practice among states in favor of removal of the nexus, this
might be apparent in the writings of legal scholars who were analyzing the status of
international criminal law at the time.
A comprehensive study of contemporaneous writings is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, it is worth noting that in their 1973 work, A TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, Messrs. Bassiouni and Nanda do not even describe
crimes against humanity as a separate crime. Crimes against humanity are discussed
but are usually conflated either with war crimes or the Genocide Convention. See
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & VED P. NANDA, 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 64 (1973) (conflating crimes against humanity
and genocide); id. at 523 (conflating crimes against humanity with war crimes).
In their second volume, on jurisdiction, they describe the importance of crimes
against humanity in terms of its coverage of "the enemy's conduct with respect to its
own population," language that implies the existence of an ongoing armed conflict.
See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & VED P. NANDA, 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, JURISDICrION AND 77 (1973). They then go on to note that Adolf
Eichmann was tried in Israel using a definition of crimes against humanity that went
"far beyond" the scope of the IMT Charter. ld. at 84. Although they never directly
criticize the scope of crimes against humanity under Israeli law, the implication is
that Israel went beyond what they viewed as the limits of then-existing international
law.
In 1980, Mr. Bassiouni proposed a draft international criminal code. It is potentially significant that he recommended that crimes against humanity be defined using
the same language as the ILC's Nuremberg Principles, including a nexus with armed
conflict. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 75 (1980). He does note in the commentary that
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In short, the customary definition of crimes against humanity
may well have lost the requirement of a nexus with armed conflict before 1975, but due to the paucity of state practice between
those two dates, it is not certain.
C.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE
DOMESTIC LAW OF STATES

There is another way to assess how countries viewed crimes
against humanity-how they have treated it in their domestic
laws. 312 As a matter of international criminal law, countries are
not required to have domestic laws criminalizing crimes against
humanity as a prerequisite to exercising jurisdiction over the
crime. Nevertheless, states have made it a crime in their domestic laws.
This section will look at: 1) whether countries have domestic
laws that prohibit crimes against humanity; 2) how crimes against
humanity are defined in domestic legislation; and 3) what year
that legislation was passed. If a significant number of states prohibited crimes against humanity in their domestic legislation
before 1975, and those same states did not require a nexus with
armed conflict, then this would be persuasive evidence that
crimes against humanity did not require a nexus with armed conflict in 1975. Investigating every state in the world in 1975 is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this section will try to look
at a sample of states. Unfortunately, the sample is skewed in
favor of English language jurisdictions and developed
13
countries.
1.

3

Germany

Germany was the first country to have a domestic legal system that defined crimes against humanity without a nexus with
armed conflict. In the wake of WWII, the victorious Allies issued Control Council Law No. 10, which provided for the prosecution of those responsible for committing atrocities during
WWII. It was based on the IMT Charter, but was significantly
there were several prosecutions under Control Council Order No. 10, which did not
require a nexus, but he does not endorse that definition. Id.
This is far from an exhaustive study of contemporaneous writings. Nevertheless, it suggests that if a general practice eliminating the nexus with armed conflict
had arisen by 1975, contemporaneous scholars did not seem to recognize it.
312. The way in which countries define crimes against humanity in their domestic
laws may be evidence of the generality of state practice, but also an indicator of
what states viewed as required by international law (sometimes known as opinio
juris). Both of these are factors that contribute to the formation of customary international law. See supra notes 303-307 (describing custom formation).
313. This bias is a consequence of the author's native language (English) and the
difficulty of finding information about the legal systems of developing countries.
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broader than the Charter in many respects. In particular, it defined crimes against humanity without a nexus to armed
3 14
conflict.
However, it appears that the novel aspects of Control Council Law No. 10, including the prohibition on crimes against humanity without a nexus to armed conflict, disappeared after 1949.
West Germany became independent in 1949 with the adoption of
the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, which
formed the constitution for the new country. It seems that the
Basic Law completely replaced the laws passed by the Control
Council. According to Human Rights Watch, there was no German domestic legislation prohibiting crimes against human rights
prior to June 2002. 3 15 In 2002, Germany adopted a new law to
cover violations of international criminal law, called the Code of
Crimes Against International Law.3 16 The new law covers genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 3 17 Crimes against
humanity are defined without a nexus with armed conflict. 3 18
Thus, it appears that after a hiatus of more than fifty years,
crimes against humanity are once again prohibited in German
domestic law.
2.

Israel

Israel was one of the earliest supporters of the removal of
the nexus requirement, 3 19 so it is not surprising that Israeli domestic law did not require a nexus with armed conflict. The 1950
Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law-the law which
was used to convict Adolf Eichmann-did not require any nexus
with armed conflict. 320
314. See supra Section II(D)(2) (describing Control Council Law No. 10 in more
detail).
315. See generally Human Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: The
State of the Art, Report dated Jun. 2006, at note 283 (stating that the only international crime explicitly defined in German law prior to June 2002 was genocide). It is
available from the Human Rights Watch website at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/
ij06O6/index.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2006). See also infra note 317 (noting the
prohibition on crimes against humanity in the 2002 Code of Crimes Against International Law).
316. See Code of Crimes Against International Law, dated Jun. 26, 2002. An
English translation is available at http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/legaltext/
vstgbleng.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2006).
317. Id., arts. 6-8.
318. Id., art. 7. The law only requires that the enumerated acts be done as part of
a "widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population."
319. See supra note 122.
320. See supra Section II(H)(1) (discussing the Eichmann trial in more detail).
See also RATNER &

ABRAMS,

supra note 27, at 52.
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France

France was also an early supporter of the removal of a nexus
with armed conflict. It first took that position during the General
Assembly debates on the ILC's Nuremberg Principles in the
early 1950s. 321 However, while crimes against humanity are mentioned in a 1952 law on the protection of refugees, 322 the law contains no definition of crimes against humanity. The first attempt
to define crimes against humanity appears to have occurred in
1964 with Law No. 64-1236. That law incorporates the definition
of crimes against humanity in324
the IMT Charter, 323 which requires
a nexus with armed conflict.
Ratner and Abrams argue that as late as 1986, the French
government took the official position that crimes against humanity required a nexus with armed conflict. 325 The new French Penal Code, which came into force in 1994, provided an updated
definition of crimes against humanity that did not require a nexus
with armed conflict. 326 Therefore, given France's early support
for the removal of the nexus with armed conflict, it is potentially
significant that French domestic law retained the nexus until the
early 1990s.
4.

United States

The United States has never had a domestic law which prohibits crimes against humanity, either with or without a nexus to
armed conflict.
5.

Canada

Canada has had a law since 1987 permitting prosecutions for
crimes against humanity "if they were regarded at the time of
their commission as contravening international law or 'criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations." 327 This definition avoids the problem of defining crimes against humanity precisely, including
whether or
not a nexus with armed conflict is necessary. 328
In 2000, Canada adopted a new Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes Act which provides a slightly more detailed but
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

See supra note 121.
See Law No. 52-893, art. 2(IV)(a) (Jul. 25, 1952).
See G.A. Res. 3(1) (Feb. 13, 1946).
See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 52.
Id. at 53.
See Penal Code, art. 212-1.

327. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 53 (quoting R.S.C. 1985, C-46, § 3.76

(Can.)).
328. Id.
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ultimately still ambiguous definition of crimes against humanity.329 According to that law, crimes against humanity are "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment,
torture, sexual violence, persecution or any other inhumane act
or omission that is committed against any civilian population or
any identifiable group," but only if at the time they were committed they "constitute[d] a crime against humanity according to
customary international law or conventional international law [or
general principles of law]."' 33 0 The law goes on to state that the
definition of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute constitutes customary international law for any acts committed after
July 17, 1998.331 This would seem to conclusively remove the
nexus requirement for acts committed after July 17, 1998 but
leaves open the question of whether acts committed prior to that
date needed to be in connection with an armed conflict.
6. Australia
Australia first criminalized war crimes in the War Crimes
Act 1945. The original act allowed for the creation of "military
courts for the trial of person charged with the commission of war
crimes. ' 332 However, "war crimes" were limited to violations of
"the laws and usages of war. '333 The War Crimes Act 1945 was
substantially rewritten by the War Crimes Amendment Act
1998. 334 The amendment broadened the law considerably, but it
retained the requirement of a connection with armed conflict, 335
and even today, Australian domestic law requires a connection
with armed conflict.
7.

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom passed a domestic law implementing
the Geneva Conventions in 1957336 and a law implementing the
Genocide Convention in 1969. 337 A 1991 War Crimes Act al329. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 2000, S.C., ch. 24 (Can.).
330. Id., art. 4(3).
331. Id., art. 4(4).
332. Polyukhovich v. Australia (1991), 172 C.L.R. 501 (Austl.) (quoting the original text of the War Crimes Act 1945).
333. Id.
334. See War Crimes Amendment Act, 1988 No. 3 (Austl.). The 1988 amendments removed all of the substantive provisions of the 1945 law and replaced them
with new ones. The only thing left intact was the original title of the Act.
335. See War Crimes Act § 7(1) (1945) (Austl.) (as amended by War Crimes
Amendment Act). It goes on to state that the prohibited acts do not constitute
crimes if their connection to an armed conflict is only "incidental" or "remote." Id.
§ 7(2). See also RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 53.
336. See Geneva Conventions Act (1957) (U.K.) (amended by Geneva Conventions Act 1995).
337. See Genocide Convention Act (1969) (U.K.).
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lowed for the prosecutioa of "murder, manslaughter or culpable

homicide," but only if it occurred during WWII and in a place
which was either a part of Germany or under German occupa-

tion.3 38 According to Ratner and Abrams, as late as 1989, a special commission set up by the British government was advising

that introducing a law prohibiting crimes against humanity in the
absence of a nexus with armed conflict would constitute "retrospective legislation. '339 Apparently, crimes against humanity
were not explicitly prohibited under British domestic law until
passage of the International Criminal Court Act of 2001.340 The
law defines crimes against humanity by reference to Article 7 of
the Rome Statute. 341
8.

Ireland

Ireland passed domestic legislation to criminalize violations
of the Geneva Conventions in 1962.342 Genocide was made a

crime in Irish law in 1973. 343 In 1998, the International War
Crimes Tribunals Act was passed, which created a mechanism for
international tribunals (including the ICTR and ICTY) to request that Irish authorities collect evidence and to arrest individuals suspected of committing crimes within the jurisdiction of the
tribunals. 344 The law contains the complete texts of the charters
of the ICTR and ICTY, including their definitions of crimes
against humanity. 3 45 As a result, crimes against humanity are
"international tribunal crimes" for which Ireland will turn over
suspects to tribunals. However, it appears that crimes against humanity are still not expressly prohibited by Irish domestic law.

338. See War Crimes Act 1991, ch. 13, § 1(1) (U.K.).
339. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 53 (quoting THOMAS HETHERINGTON & WILLIAM CHALMERS, WAR CRIMES: REPORT OF THE WAR CRIMES INQUIRY

63-64 (1989)).

340. See International Criminal Court Act 2001, ch. 17, §§ 51, 58 (U.K.) (making
it a crime to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide). See also
Human Rights Watch, supra note 315, at note 422 (noting that jurisdiction can only
be exercised over crimes against humanity if they were committed after the International Criminal Court Act entered into force).
341. See International Criminal Court 2001, ch. 17, § 50 (U.K.).
342. Geneva Conventions Act arts. 3-4, 1962 (Act No. 11/1962) (Ir.). The law
was amended in 1998 to incorporate the two optional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 1998 (Act No.35/1998) (Ir.).
343. Genocide Act art. 2(1), 1973 (No.28/1973) (Ir.) (defining genocide by reference to the Genocide Convention).
344. See International War Crimes Tribunals Act, 1998 (No.40/1998) (Ir.).
345. Id. Schedules 3 and 4.
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9. Belgium
Belgium has been at the forefront of the domestic application of international criminal law in recent years. 346 Belgium
started, in 1993, by providing a mechanism to prosecute individu347
als in Belgium for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
The law was expanded in 1999 to also prohibit genocide and
crimes against humanity. 34 8 Crimes against humanity are described as encompassing those acts committed "en temps de paix
ou en temps de guerre. '' 349 Accordingly, Belgian law does not
require any proof of a nexus with armed conflict.
The 1993 law provided for universal jurisdiction over war
crimes, which was then extended to include genocide and crimes
against humanity in 1999. This created problems for the Belgian
government after a number of prominent politicians had criminal
complaints filed against them. 35 0 Under pressure, the government repealed the 1993 and 1999 laws in 2003. The provisions
covering the substantive crimes were then incorporated into the
Penal Code without the universal jurisdiction provisions. 35 1 The
Penal Code does not require
a nexus with armed conflict for
3 52
crimes against humanity.
10.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands prohibited certain wartime offenses in 1952
and introduced legislation to implement the Genocide Convention in 1964. 353 However, crimes against humanity were not prohibited in Dutch domestic law until the passage of the
International Crimes Act in 2003. 354 Section 4 of that Act requires only that the enumerated acts be committed "as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian pop346. See generally Human Rights Watch, supra note 315, at Section VI (providing
a case study of universal jurisdiction for international criminal law in Belgium).
347. See Loi relative A la rdpression des infractions graves aux conventions internationales de Gen~ve du 12 aolt 1949 et aux Protocoles I et II du 8 juin 1977, additionnels A ces Conventions, Moniteur Belge (Aug. 5, 1993).
348. See Loi relative A la r6pression des violations graves de droit international
humanitaire, Moniteur Beige (Feb, 10, 1999).
349. Id.

350. See Human Rights Watch, supra nn. 315, at nn. 140-143.
351. Id. See also, Arts. 136bis (genocide), 136ter (crimes against humanity), and
136quater (war crimes) of the Belgian Penal Code.
352. See Art. 136ter of the Belgian Penal Code.
353. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 315, at note 320.
354. Id. at nn.318-19. See also DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTRY, INTRODUCTION TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES ACT, available at http://www.minbuza.nl/en/themes,

international-legal-order/international-criminal-court/background-information/
Introduction-to-the-International-Crimes-Act.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2006) (noting that prior to 2003 "there existed a lacuna [in Dutch law] with regard to crimes
against humanity, which were not criminalized").
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ulation. '' 355 A nexus with armed conflict is not required in Dutch
law.
11.

Nigeria, Guinea, Kenya and Rwanda

Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria and Rwanda are the only four African countries to have become parties to both the 1968 Convention on Statutes of Limitation and the Apartheid Convention by
1976.356 These conventions seem to represent African efforts to
broaden the definition of crimes against humanity prior to 1975.
Consequently, of all the African states, these are the most likely
to have criminalized crimes against humanity in their domestic
laws and removed the nexus with armed conflict. Unfortunately,
information on the state of African laws is hard to find, and the
conclusions presented here are tentative.
First, it appears that Nigeria has never prohibited crimes
against humanity in its domestic laws. 357 Second, Guinea only
became a party to the Geneva Conventions in 1984,358 and the
Genocide Convention in 2000. 359 According to the ICRC,
Guinea's 1998 Penal Code prohibits some acts which would
probably constitute war crimes. 360 However, it seems unlikely
that Guinea prohibited crimes against humanity in its domestic
law prior to 1975. Kenya became a party to the Geneva Conventions in 1966,361 and Kenya's Geneva Conventions Act came into

force in

1968.362

Kenya is not a party to the Genocide Conven-

355. Wet Internationale Misdrijven [International Crimes], Stb. 2003, No. 270.
An English translation is available at http://www.minbuza.nl/en/themes,international-legal-order/international-criminal-court/background-informationlnternational-Crimes-Act.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2006).
356. See supra notes 200, 232.
357. The Nigerian Criminal Code Act contains no provisions related to crimes
against humanity. See Criminal Code Act, ch. 77, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
1990, available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/Criminal%20Code%2OAct-Tables.htm
(last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
358. Http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsflWebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited
Aug. 14, 2006) (listing the parties to the Geneva Convention).
359. Http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3fb/treatylgen.htm (last visited Aug. 14,
2006) (listing the parties to the Genocide Convention).
360. See International Humanitarian Law National Implementation available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/WebALL?openview (last visited Aug. 14, 2006)
(describing the implementation of the Geneva Conventions in various countries).
361. See http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited Aug. 14, 2006) (listing the parties to the Geneva Convention).
362. Geneva Conventions Act, ch. 198 (1968) (Kenya), available at http://www.
kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr-app/frames.php. Kenya Law Online is a service of the
National Council for Law Reporting, a body created by the Kenyan government to
publish Kenya Law Reports. See About Kenya Law Reports, http://www.kenyalaw.
org/about/index.php.
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tion,363

and Kenyan law does not appear to criminalize either ge-

nocide or crimes against humanity.
Rwanda joined the Geneva Conventions in 1964 and the
Genocide Convention in 1975. 364 In 1996, in response to the
1994 atrocities, Rwanda passed a law which created a mechanism

to conduct trials of those accused of committing crimes against

humanity and genocide. 365 However, the law was quite limited
and only allowed prosecutions for crimes committed after Octo-

ber 1,

1990.366

Moreover, while it allowed for prosecutions for

genocide and crimes against humanity, it relied on references to

the crimes "as defined" in the Genocide Convention, the Geneva
Conventions, and the 1968 Convention on Statutes of Limita-

tion. 367 In 2003, Rwanda adopted domestic legislation explicitly
368

defining war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
The law defines crimes against humanity as requiring only36 a9
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.
12.

Others

According to a June 2006 Human Rights Watch report,
neither Norway nor Denmark has incorporated any international
crimes into its domestic laws, and each relies on prosecuting individuals under common domestic crimes like murder, rape and assault.370 In 1946, China criminalized a class of acts that was
broader than the typical definition of war crimes, but still required that those acts be committed "before or during a period
of hostilities."'37 1 Prior to passage of the Implementation of the

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act in 2002,
South Africa did not have any statutory or common law defini363. Http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treatylgen.htm (last visited Aug. 14,
2006) (listing the parties to the Genocide Convention).
364. International Humanitarian Law National Implementation available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsflWebALL?openview (last visited Aug. 14, 2006)
(describing the implementation of the Geneva Conventions in various countries).
See also http://www.cicr.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited
Aug. 14, 2006) (listing the parties to the Geneva Convention).
365. See Organic Law No. 08/96 (Rwanda) (1996) on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity. A translation, in English, is available from the website of Prevent Genocide
International at http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2006). A copy, in French, is available from the ICRC website at http://
www.icrc.orglihl-nat.nsf/0/2F8A6D659284E2F4C1257084004FOA04.
366. Organic Law, supra note 365, art. 1.
367. Id.
368. See Law No. 33 bis/2003, Repressing the Crime of Genocide, Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes (2003) (Rwanda), available at http://www.icrc.
org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/2C4E9B18DD164434C1257084004C3D9C.
369. Id., art. 5.
370. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 315, at nn.93-96.
371.

See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 53-54.
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tion of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. 372
South Africa defines crimes against humanity by reference to the
Rome Statute and does not require a nexus with armed conflict.373 Crimes against humanity were first criminalized in Spain
in 2004374 and require only that they be "parte de un ataque
generalizado o sistemditico contra la poblaci6n civil. '375 The Soviet Union never criminalized crimes against humanity or genocide and the Russian Federation only criminalized genocide in
1997.376 It appears that crimes against humanity are still not prohibited in Russian domestic law.
This examination of the treatment of crimes against humanity in the domestic laws of states is incomplete. In 1975 there
were 144 member states in the United Nations, 377 but this section
has only examined the laws of twenty-one countries. In addition,
the selection of those countries was unavoidably biased in favor
of English language jurisdictions and developed countries. Nevertheless, the results are striking. Very few countries prohibited
crimes against humanity in their domestic laws prior to 1975.
Only Israel and Germany used a definition of crimes against humanity that did not require a nexus with armed conflict, and it
appears that Germany only used that definition during the period that it was occupied by the Allies between 1946 and 1949.
France, which had been an early supporter of removing the nexus
with armed conflict, defined crimes against humanity using the
IMT definition. China prohibited some acts which might be considered crimes against humanity but required a connection with
armed conflict. No other country was found that prohibited
crimes against humanity in its domestic laws prior to 1975. In
372. See Anton Katz, An Act of Transformation:The Incorporationof the Rome

Statute of the ICC into National law in South Africa, 12(4) AFR. SEC. REV. 25, 27
(2003), available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No4/F3.pdf (last visited Aug.
14, 2006).
373. Id.
374. See Human Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe, supra note 315,
at nn.383-84.
375. See Spanish Criminal Code, art. 607bis (1995) (Spain), available at http://
noticias.juridicas.com/basedatos/Penal/lol0-1995.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).
376. See Prevent Genocide International, webpage on Russian Federation available at http://www.preventgenocide.org/ru/statia357.htm (quoting an excerpt from the
1997 Russian Federal Criminal Code, Article 357, which prohibits genocide). Cf.
Fourteenth periodic report of States parties due in 1994: Russian Federation, Report
on compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/299/Add.15, 20 (Jul. 28, 1996) (noting that the 1997 Criminal Code's inclusion of genocide sets it apart from the 1960
Criminal Code). The report is available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/23a89bf
90e53e6ccc125656300593189/9c2a2d5b40020ece80256587005964ca?OpenDocument
(last visited Aug. 15, 2006).
377. See Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-2006, available at http://
www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).
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short, there is little evidence of a widespread acceptance of
crimes against humanity in the domestic laws of states prior to
1975-with or without a nexus with armed conflict.
In fact, countries did not seem to integrate crimes against
humanity into their domestic laws in large numbers until after
the negotiation of the Rome Statute in the summer of 1998.
However, while crimes against humanity may not have been
widely prohibited in domestic laws prior to 1999, that does not
directly affect its existence in international law. In fact, one
would expect there to be a significant delay between the creation
of a crime in international law and its incorporation into the domestic laws of states. For example, the Genocide Convention
was created in 1948 and the Geneva Conventions in 1949, yet
many states did not criminalize them in their domestic laws until
years or decades later. 378 Despite the relatively slow incorporation of war crimes and genocide into domestic law, they were still
widely recognized as constituting international law shortly after
they were created (and long before they become domestic law in
most countries). Consequently, the late adoption of crimes
against humanity in domestic law does not prove that it was not
customary international law. As discussed above, the widespread
acceptance of the Nuremberg Principles demonstrates that
crimes against humanity (as defined in the IMT Charter) were
part of international criminal law by the early 1950s at the
latest. 379
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
The principle of legality380 prohibits individuals from being
found criminally responsible for conduct which was not criminal
at the time of its commission. 38 1 Unlike the Rome Statute, 382 the
378. The United Kingdom implemented the Genocide Convention in 1969 and
the Geneva Conventions in 1957, delays of twenty-one years and eight years, respectively. See supra notes 336-37. Ireland had delays of twenty-five years and thirteen
years, respectively. See supra note 342-43. The Netherlands had delays of sixteen
years and three years, respectively. See supra note 353.
379. See supra note 124.
380. The principle of legality is also sometimes referred to by two Latin maxims:
1) nullum crimen sine lege; and 2) nullum poena sine lege. These translate as "no
crime without law" and "no punishment without law." See RATNER & ABRAMS,
supra note 27, at 21. The principle of legality encompasses both concepts.
381. See Susan Lamb, Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International
Criminal Law, in ANTONIO CASSESE, 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 733, 733 (2002); RATNER & ABRAMS,

supra note 27, at 21. William Schabas has described the principle of legality as forbidding "prosecution of crimes that were not recognized as such at the time they
were committed." See Schabas, supra note 286, at 70. Other authors have recognized that the "core prohibition" in the principle of legality is the prohibition "on
the retroactive application of criminal law." See Bruce Broomhall, Article 22: Nul-
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Extraordinary Chambers Law does not specifically discuss the
principle of legality. However, the Extraordinary Chambers are
obligated to "exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness, and due process of law," as
set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 383 Article 15(1) of the

ICCPR states, in part, that "[n]o one shall be held guilty of any
criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law,
at the time when it was committed. ' 384 Consequently, the principle of legality does apply at the Extraordinary Chambers. It is
also required by customary international law, Cambodia's
treaty
3 85
obligations, and the Constitution of Cambodia.
lum Crimen Sine Lege, in

COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 447, 447

(Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
382. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 22-23. The prohibition on retroactive application of the law is contained in Article 22. Id., art.
22(1) ("A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the
conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the court."). The prohibition on punishment without law is contained in
Article 23. Id., art. 23 ("A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in
accordance with this Statute.").
383. Extraordinary Chambers Law, art. 33.
384. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15(1), Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/
ccpr.htm. The text of the ICCPR was included as an annex to G.A. Res. 2200 (Dec.
16, 1966). Article 15 of the ICCPR is very similar to the language of Article 11 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). See Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/
810 (1948).
385. The principle of legality is one of the most fundamental customary requirements of international criminal law. See Lamb, supra note 381, at 734 (describing
the principle of legality as a "well-established norm[ ] of customary international
law"); Broomhall, supra note 381, at 447 (describing it as a "fundamental principle
of any criminal justice system"); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 21 (describing it as a "fundamental precept of international criminal law"). It became customary international law shortly after the end of World War II. See Lamb, supra note
381, at 740-41; Broomhall, supra note 381, at 453-54. As a matter of customary international law, the Extraordinary Chambers would be obligated to apply the principle of legality to any prosecutions for crimes against humanity.
The principle of legality has been included in numerous human rights treaties,
including the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Broomhall, supra note 381, at 453-54. It is also incorporated into the Third Geneva Convention of 1949. See Lamb, supra note 381, at 741. Cambodia is a party to the
ICCPR and the Geneva Conventions, and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is incorporated into Cambodian law by Article 31 of the Cambodian Constitution. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, as of
Jun. 9, 2004, available at http://www.unhchr.chlpdf/report.pdf (last visited May 25,
2006); International Committee for the Red Cross, States party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, dated Dec. 4, 2005 available at http://www.
icrc.orglWeb/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/partygc/$File/Conventions% 20de%2OGeneve
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The principle of legality prevents someone from being prosecuted for a crime, unless there was an existing law which made
that act criminal. This prohibition on the retroactive application
of criminal law is considered essential to the rule of law. 386 It is

based on the assumption that rational actors will modify their
actions to take into account the law. 387 However, before actors
can conform their actions to the law, it is essential that the law be
known or knowable. If the law was unknowable at the time of

the action (as it is in the case where it is applied retroactively),
then actors cannot modify their behavior to conform to the law,
and it is unfair to prosecute them for its violation. 388 Essentially,
the principle of legality prevents actors from being punished for
actions they could not predict were illegal and thus could not
avoid.
Unfortunately, the principle of legality is harder to apply in

the context of international law than it is in domestic law. In
international law, there is no one body that has exclusive legisla-

tive power. Rather, international law can be formed in numerous ways. Consequently, it can sometimes be difficult to know
the extent of the law, particularly when dealing with customary
law, which is the sum product of the actions of states and may not
be written down anywhere. 38 9 This has led some to argue that

crimes based on customary international law are automatically a
violation of the principle of legality because customary law is inherently uncertain. 390 However, this argument goes too far.

Laws do not have to be written to be knowable; there is no theoretical reason why unwritten customs cannot be sufficiently welldeveloped that actors should be expected to take them into account when choosing their course of action. 391 Rather than an
%20et%20Protocoles%20additionnels%20ENG.pdf (last visited May 25, 2006);
Cambodian Constitution, art. 31, available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/
cambodia.htm ("The Kingdom of Cambodia shall recognize and respect human
).
rights as stipulated in ... the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ....
386. See Broomhall, supra note 381, at 450-51 (noting that legal systems that allow retroactive application of criminal laws increase the discretion of the judiciary
and police, and in extreme form, result in "the abandonment of the rule of law").
Such a legal system would increase the discretion of the legislative authorities to an
undesirable degree by allowing them to punish acts which were undertaken in the
reasonable belief they were legal.
387. Id. at 450.
388. See Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., 295, 43 (2004)
(holding that a "law" is only valid if "it is formulated with sufficient precision to
enable the citizen to regulate his conduct").
389. See Lamb, supra note 381, at 743 (noting the difficulty of applying the principle of legality to customary international law).
390. See Lamb, supra note 381, at nn.4, 61.
391. Cf. S.W. v. United Kingdom, No. 47/1994/494/576, Eur. Ct. H.R. 52, 35
(1995). The court was interpreting Article 7 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which mirrors the language of both the Article 11 of the UDHR and Article
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arbitrary focus on whether a law is written or not, the essence of
the principle of legality has to do with whether a law is knowable
or not.
In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the principle of legality to require "accessibility and
foreseeability. ' '392 This view of the principle of legality acknowledges that the law need not be perfectly certain to be enforceable 3 93 and allows for the gradual development of criminal law so
long as the results are foreseeable. 394 Moreover, a development
or expansion of the law is not unforeseeable simply because the
accused did not foresee it. Such a development can meet the
principle of legality even though the accused would have needed
"appropriate legal advice" to assess the direction of the law. 395
In effect, this interpretation assumes that actors are rational and
that they can and should make reasonable predictions about the
future course of the law and act accordingly. Holding those actors liable for foreseeable developments of the law is not funda15 of the ICCPR. It concluded that the "law" at issue "comprises written as well as
unwritten law ...." Id.
Ratner and Abrams acknowledge that customary norms may be definite
enough to pass muster under the principle of legality, although they note that there
are potential dangers inherent in the use of customary law. See RATNER & ABRAMS,
supra note 27, at 21-22. For example, it may be problematic to rely too heavily on
scholarly writings to determine the content of customary international law because
scholarly writings tend to argue for the extension or expansion of international law
and may not accurately represent the contemporaneous state of customary law. Id.
at 22.
This article has focused on the actions of states, rather than the writings of
scholars. No essential argument relies exclusively on scholarly writings, although
they have been used to "flesh out" arguments. Consequently, the author believes
that the danger that Ratner and Abrams describe has been minimized.
392. In S.W. v. United Kingdom, supra note 391, the European Court of Human
Rights concluded that a law would not violate the principle of legality enshrined in
the European Convention in Human Rights-which is essentially the same as that
found in the UDHR and the ICCPR-so long as it was accessible and foreseeable.
Id., 135.
393. Perfect certainty is not required. See Chauvy v. France, App. No. 64915/01,
Eur. Ct. H.R. 295, 43 (2004) ("Those consequences need not be foreseeable with
absolute certainty."). Moreover, it is probably impossible because laws are "inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague ...." Id. Nor
would it even be desirable because it would result in "excessive rigidity" and prevent
the law from adapting to changing circumstances. Id.
394. See S.W. v. United Kingdom, No. 47/1994/494/576, Eur. Ct. H.R. 52, 1 43
(1995) (holding that a foreseeable "evolution" of criminal law did not violate the
principle of legality). See also Radio France v. France, App. No. 53984/00, 2004-11
Eur. Ct. H.R. 40, 20 (noting that the principle of legality "does not outlaw general
clarification of the rules of criminal liability" provided that the result is reasonably
foreseeable).
395. See Chauvy, supra note 393, at 44 ("A law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to take appropriate legal
advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.").
HeinOnline -- 24 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 196 2006-2007

2007]

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

mentally unfair and does not violate the principle of legality.
Moreover, this flexible interpretation of the principle of legality
acknowledges that there is always bound to be some uncertainty
when interpreting laws and prevents the law from being excessively rigid.
The European Court of Human Right's treatment of the
principle of legality is more convincing than that endorsed by the
IMT and the other World War II courts, which tended to treat
the principle of legality as an obstacle that had to be overcome
because of overriding political considerations. 396 To a lesser extent, the ICTY and ICTR have also treated the principle of legality as an obstacle to be overcome, rather than as an essential
component of the rule of law. 3 97 In contrast, the International
Criminal Court has a narrow definition of the principle of legality
that limits criminal responsibility to the crimes as they are defined in the Rome Statute, prohibits the extension of those
crimes by analogy, and specifies that any ambiguities about the
application of the principle must be resolved in favor of the accused. 3 98 However, the International Criminal Court has the advantage of being treaty-based, which allows the elements of the
crimes to be carefully negotiated and defined. That level of specificity in the elements of the crimes is unlikely to be present
where the crime is based on customary international law. The
Rome Statute acknowledges that its application of the principle
of legality may be narrower than required under international
law.

399

Just as the IMT, ICTY, and ICTR have used a definition of
the principle of legality that is too loose, the ICC uses a definition that is narrower than necessary. Only the European Court
of Human Right's emphasis on foreseeability adequately protects
396. See Lamb, supra note 381, at 735-40 (concluding that the arguments and
conclusions reached by the WWII courts regarding the principle of legality were all
legally flawed); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 27, at 22 (describing the IMT's view

of the principle of legality as "extremely loose and controversial"). See also supra
note 62 (noting that the IMT's finding that it was applying existing international law
was motivated more by political than legal considerations).
397. See Lamb, supra note 381, at 742-45 (noting that the principle of legality
"has not, in practice, served to limit the ad hoc Tribunals' exercise of its jurisdiction
in any meaningful way"). The ICTY and ICTR have consistently ruled in favor of
the expansion of their own jurisdiction. For example, in the Tadic case, supra note
277, at 92, the ICTY concluded that its "primary purpose" was "not to leave unpunished any person guilty of any such serious violation, whatever the context
within which it may have been committed." This understanding of its purpose led
the ICTY to embrace an extremely broad view of its own jurisdiction.
398. See Rome Statute, supra note 382, art. 22.
399. Id. (noting that its application of the principle of legality "shall not affect the
characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law independently of
this Statute").
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the important policy justification for the principle of legalitythat an actor must be able to predict what the law prohibits
before it is fair to punish him for failing to comply with the lawwhile retaining an element of flexibility.
V.

CONCLUSION

The discussion of the principle of legality leads to the ultimate question: Can the Extraordinary Chambers try people for
crimes against humanity using the definition contained in the EC
Law? There is a strong argument that it can. As noted above,
the state of crimes against humanity may have been uncertain in
1975. The crime was in the middle of undergoing a transition
from requiring a nexus with armed conflict to dispensing with the
nexus requirement. That transition probably occurred at some
point between 1968 and 1984-and may well have occurred
before 1975-but there is insufficient evidence of state practice
to pin down the date more precisely. However, the fact that the
law may have been uncertain in 1975 does not automatically violate the principle of legality because some uncertainty is permissible. 40 0 Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether the senior
leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (hereafter
"CPK") could have predicted that they would be charged with
crimes against humanity in the absence of an armed conflict. To
some extent, this question is probably artificial. 40 1 Nevertheless,
the inquiry is not whether senior leaders of the CPK did anticipate that they would be charged, but whether it was possible that
they could have anticipated it.
As members of the government of a state, it should be assumed that they had access to appropriate legal advice on the
state of international law. 40 2 Although the state of the law was
somewhat uncertain, the review of the development of crimes
against humanity above suggests that an international lawyer
would probably have advised the CPK in 1975 that crimes against
humanity was undergoing a transition and that there was a growing belief amongst states that the nexus with armed conflict was
unnecessary. She would have noted the Charter of the IMT and
the Nuremberg Principles, both of which require a nexus with
armed conflict. These fundamental documents represented the
400. See supra notes 393-95.
401. The author does not know whether the CPK leadership ever contemplated
being charged with crimes against humanity or received any legal advice on the state
of crimes against humanity during the period 1975-1979, although it seems unlikely.
402. See supra note 395. If citizens of a state can be assumed to have access to
legal advice to know the state of domestic law, then members of the government of a
state can probably be assumed to have access to legal advice on the state of international law.
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state of crimes against humanity immediately after WWII. How-

ever, a search would also have identified other significant documents and events, including the ILC's 1954 draft code of
offences, the Eichmann trial, as well as the 1968 Convention on
Statutes of Limitation. 403 These indicate a trend toward removal
of the nexus requirement. Indeed, by 1968, the group of states

supporting removal of the nexus requirement was larger than the

group opposing removal. 40 4 She might also have noted that the
two aspects of crimes against humanity which had already been
codified, genocide and apartheid, 40 5 did not require a nexus with
armed conflict. In short, while she would probably have concluded that the exact state of the law was uncertain due to the
scarcity of state practice, she would probably have warned the
senior leaders of the CPK that there was: 1) a well-established
historical trend toward the elimination of the nexus requirement;
and 2) a distinct possibility that the nexus 6requirement had al40
ready been removed from customary law.
In conclusion, even though it is uncertain exactly when the
nexus requirement was eliminated from the definition of crimes

against humanity, there is a strong argument that the Extraordinary Chambers can try people using the definition in the EC Law
because either: 1) the nexus requirement had already disappeared from the definition of crimes against humanity by 1975;
or 2) it was foreseeable in 1975 that the nexus requirement would
be eliminated, and the information necessary to come to this conclusion was accessible. On the other hand, there is also some
evidence that removal of the nexus requirement did not become
a "general practice" until later, perhaps during or immediately
40 7
after the negotiation of the Rome Statute.
403. It is worth noting that virtually all of the information used in Sections II(A)II(H) of this paper to identify the status of crimes against humanity would have been
accessible in 1975. There can be little doubt that the evidence necessary to predict
the course of the law was accessible. Thus it meets the first prong of the accessible
and foreseeable test.
404. See supra notes 222-23.
405. The Genocide Convention was opened for signature in 1948. See supra Section II(F). The Apartheid Convention was opened for signature in 1973. See supra
Section II(H)(4). Neither convention required a nexus with armed conflict.
406. In this way, the situation is analogous to that in S.W. v. United Kingdom,
No. 47/1994/494/576, Eur. Ct. H.R. 52, [ 35 (1995). There, the accused was ultimately held to be liable for raping his wife despite the existence of a common law
principle that a husband could not be guilty of raping his wife. The court concluded
that the common law immunity for husbands had been under attack for some time,
and the law was going through an "evident evolution" towards the elimination of
that immunity. Consequently, the accused's conviction did not the principle of legality because "judicial recognition of the absence of the immunity had become a reasonably foreseeable development of the law." Id. TT 40-44, 43.
407. See supra notes 265-276 (describing the inclusion of a nexus requirement in
the statute of the ICTY); supra notes 283-287 (describing objections to the removal
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of the nexus with armed conflict during the negotiation of the Rome Statute); supra
notes 377-78 (noting that the Rome Statute may have been a turning point in how
states defined crimes against humanity in their domestic laws).
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